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Missouri Law Review
Volume XX November, 1955 Number 4
THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
FOR TIE YEAR 1954
STATISTICAL SURVEY
LEo E. EICKHOFF, Jn."
The statistical survey for 1954 shows that during the year 274
majority opinions were written by the judges and commissioners of the
Supreme Court of Missouri.1 This number has been exceeded only once
since 1945, when 291 opinions were filed in 1952. The year's total
showed an increase of four opinions from the preceeding year. Opinions
on four appeals were rendered in the same opinion with four other
appeals.2
In addition to the 274 majority opinions, there were 4 opinions con-
curring in result, 10 opinions dissenting from the majority and 1 opinion
dissenting from the majority in part. There were 20 concurrences in
result without opinion, 10 dissents without opinion, 2 dissents in part
without opinion and 1 judge signified dubitante to a decision without a
written opinion. There were 11 opinions written on motions and attached
to case opinions. The court was able to all concur in 164 decisions.
*Chairman, Board of Student Editors.
1. The Supreme Court list of majority opinions for 1954 showed that 292
opinions were written. Eleven of those opinions because of rehearing or transfer
to the court en bane were not published in 1954. Seven divisional opinions that
were written were transferred to the court en bane and were rewritten by another
justice.
2. Total majority opinions for the preceeding years is as follows: 1935, 331;
1936, 3869; 1937, 277; 1938, 303; 1939, 290; 1940, 282; 1941, 336; 1942, 293; 1943, 306;
1944, 264; 1945, 197; 1946, 181; 1947, 244; 1948, 254; 1949, 244; 1950, 265; 1951, 259;
1952, 291; 1953, 270.
(329)
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During the year seven justices wrote 114 majority opinions, 7 dis-
senting opinions, and 1 opinion dissenting in part, and 4 concurring
opinions. The six commissioners wrote 135 majority opinions and 3
dissenting opinions. Six special justices wrote 25 majority opinions. Court
of Appeal Judges Lyon Anderson, Walter E. Bennick, James W. Broad-
dus, Nick T. Cave, Samuel A. Dew, and A. P. Stone, Jr. served as
Special Judges for brief periods. Chief Justice Roscoe P. Conlding died
October 28, 1954. Commissioner Henry J. Westhues became a Judge
in Division One on December 20, 1954. Mr. Alden A. Stockard was
appointed a Commissioner for Division Two on December 23, 1954.
TABLE I
NumER OF OPINIONS WRITTEN BY EACH DIVISION
En Banc 47
Division Number One 122
Division Number Two 105
Total 274
Table 11 represents a classification of the opinions according to
their dominant issue. The selection of the most important issue was
somewhat arbitrary, since nearly every case contained several issues.
TABLE II
TOPICAL AwALYSIS OF DECISIONS
Abatement and Revival 1
Administrative Law and Procedure 1
Adoption 2
Appeal and Error 11
Assault and Battery 1
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Executors and Administrators 2
Fraudulent Conveyances 1
Guaranty I










Landlord and Tenant 3
Libel and Slander 1
Malpractice I
Mandamus 3












Res Ipsa Loquitur 3
Res Judicata 2
Schools and School Districts 1
Specific Performance 3
Statutes of Fraud 4
Statutes of Limitation 3
3
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Theaters and Shows 1
Trial 15
Trust 3







Table M shows the disposition made of each case for which an
opinion was written. The particular wording is basically that of the
judge or commissioner writing the opinion. These figures include the
disposition of the original proceedings handled by the court.
TABLE I
DisPosiTioN OF LITIGATION
Alternative Writ Made Peremptory 2
Alternative Writ of Manadmus Made Premptory 2
Alternative Writ Quashed 1
Appeal Dismissed 5
Cause Transferred to Court of Appeals 14
Decree Affirmed 4
Decree Modified and as Modified Affirmed 1
Decree Reversed and Cause Remanded with Directions 2
Judgment Affirmed 136
Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part
and Remanded 1
Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part
and Remanded with Directions 3
Judgment Affirmed on Condition of Remittitur .. . .. 10
Judgment and Decree Affirmed 1
Judgment of Disbarment Ordered 1
Judgment of Dismissal Affirmed 3
Judgment Modified and Affirmed as Modified 1
Judgment Reversed 5
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded 31
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded with Directions - 16
Judgment Reversed and Defendant Ordered Discharged -. 1
(Vol. 20
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Judgment and Decree Reversed and Cause Remanded
with Directions 1
Order Affirmed 2
Order and Decree Affirmed I
Order and Judgment Affirmed 1
Order Granting New Trial Affirmed and Cause
Remanded 8
Order Granting New Trial Affirmed in Part and
Reversed in Part I
Order Granting New Trial Set Aside and Cause
Remanded with Directions 3
Order Granting New Trial Set Aside and Judgment
Reinstated --- 4
Order and Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
with Directions 1
Ouster Denied 1
Peremptory Writ Issued 1
Preliminary Rule in Prohibition Made Absolute 3
Preliminary Rule in Prohibition Discharged 2
Provisional Rule in Prohibition Made Absolute in Part
and Discharged in Part__ 1
Writ Ordered Quashed 1
Writ of Mandamus Ordered Quashed 1
Writ of Quo Warranto Ordered Quashed 1
Total 274
Table IV shows how the court disposed of motions which were
presented subsequent to the decision, so far as may be ascertained from
the reported opinions. Cases wherein rehearings or transfers were
granted are not included.
TABLE IV
MOTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO DEcIsION
Motion for Rehearing and to Correct Opinion Denied ___ 1
Motion for Rehearing or to Modify Opinion Denied 2
Motion for Rehearing or to Modify Opinion or to
Transfer to Court En Banc Denied 1
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court
En Banc Denied 55
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court
En Banc Denied and Opinion Modified 5
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court
En Banc or to Reverse and Remand Denied 1
5
Eickhoff: Eickhoff: Work of the Supreme Court 1954
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1955
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Motion to Modify Opinion Denied 1
Opinion Modified on Court's Own Motion 2
Rehearing Denied 25




THE JUISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The troublesome question of appellate juridiction is still with us.
The record for the year under review is eleven cases transferred to
the court of appeals, two of them being retransfers after the court of
appeals had first received the appeals and had transferred them to
the supreme court. In one of them, Heuer v. Ulmer' where the claim of
plaintiffs was for approximately $3,000.00 and defendant, by counter-
claim, sought a judgment against plaintiffs for over $12,000.00, the jury
found for defendant on plaintiffs' petition and for plaintiffs on defendant's
counterclaim, and both parties appealed. When the record reached the
court of appeals they filed a joint motion asking for transfer to the
supreme court because the combined amount on the plaintiffs' claim
and on the counterclaim was in excess of the monetary jurisdiction of
the court of appeals. That motion was sustained;2 but when the case
reached the supreme court the defendant, by brief, informed the court
that he was making no point on the counterclaim but had appealed
only in order to protect the record in case the issues on plaintiffs' suit
should be remanded for a new trial. Consequently, since the issue
adversely ruled on the counterclaim was not presented in the supreme
court on appeal it was regarded as abandoned, leaving the amount in
dispute only the amount of plaintiffs' claim which was less than the
monetary jurisdiction of the supreme court. Accordingly, the case
was retransferred to the court of appeals.
*Attorney, Kansas City, LIJ.B., Kansas City School of Law, 1912.
1. 273 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. 1954).
2. 264 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. App. 1954).
[Vol. 20
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It is, of course, the rule that the amount in dispute must affirmatively
appear from the record in order to give the supreme court, rather than
the court of appeals, appellate jurisdiction. That is illustrated in Baer
v. Baer,3 a divorce decree, where the trial court allowed monthly alimony
and the wife, on appeal, contended that the discussion of the trial court
was abused in not ordering the wife alimony in gross in the sum of
$75,000.00. Notwithstanding the fact that while the judgment is subject
to modification by the court, or termination on the death of either party,
or upon appellant's remarriage, the court holds that "none of these
things may happen until after the installments accruing under the judg-
ment appealed from equals or exceeds the amount claimed by appellant.
Accordingly, we cannot say that definitely and certainly and regardless
of contingencies the difference in the money value of the alimony claimed
and the alimony granted exceeds the necessary jurisdictional amount."
As a result, the case was transferred to the court of appeals for decision.
Upon similar reasoning, the court also transferred the case of State ex rel
v. Drainage District4 where, although the District appealed from a con-
demnation award of $10,000, it was clear that the minimum amount
conceded to be due on the condemnation left an amount in dispute less
than that required to support the jurisdiction of the supreme court.
So, also, in Kansas City v. National Engineering Company5 and State
ex rel State Highway Commission v. Schade,6 appeals from condemnation
awards where the appellant claimed less than $7500.00 more than had
been awarded him did not involve the requisite jurisdictional amount and
those cases, also, were transferred.
The existence of a constitutional question as the basis for appellate
jurisdiction in the supreme court must also be firmly established by a
record showing that such question was raised at the first available
opportunity, that the constitutional provision claimed to have been
violated was then specifically designated, that the facts are such as to
show such violation, and that the question has been preserved throughout
the record for appellate review. None of those requirements were met
in the case of State ex rel Thompson v. Roberts,7 and that case was
transferred to the court of appeals. In the opinion it is pointed out that
3. 274 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1954).
4. 271 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. 1954).
5. 265 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. 1954).
6. 265 S.W.2d 383 (Mo. 1954).
7. 264 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1954).
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"this is not to place undue emphasis upon the technicalities involved
in jurisdictional problems, the courts of appeal are courts of general
jurisdiction, and this court has such limited jurisdiction as is specifically
conferred." Again, in McCiard v. Morrison8 an appeal from a judgment
awarding the landowners no damages in an action to establish a private
roadway across the property of an adjoining landowner, the court held
that it was too late to complain, for the first time in the motion for new
trial, that constitutional rights were violated; and further held that the
claim that the statute permitting an easement to be established across ap-
pellant's land without monetary compensation was taking property for
public or private use without just compensation was, in reality, not a
question of the constitutionality of the statute but only of an erroneous
result in the very judicial procedure in which they joined without
objection. Holding, further, that the action did not involve title to real
estate in the jurisdictional sense, the case was transferred to the court
of appeals.
In Stewart v. Stewart,9 the court again applies the well established
rule that for the supreme court to have jurisdiction on the ground that
title to real estate is involved "the title must be in dispute, that is, there
must be a title controversy to be settled", and held that title to real
estate is not involved in the jurisdictional sense where the suit is one
in partition and the question to be determined is the manner in which
the partition is to be accomplished. The court also held that where the
object of the suit is not to obtain a money judgment, but other relief,
the amount in dispute for jurisdictional purposes is determined by the
value in money to the plaintiff of the relief sought, or the loss to the
defendant should the relief be granted and that unless there is an
affirmative showing in the record that such amount is in excess of the
monetary jurisdiction of the supreme court it is without jurisdiction on
that ground. The Court also held, in Reece v. VanGilder'0 that it does
not have jurisdiction of a suit in equity to recover a money judgment
and to have that judgment declared a special lien against the real estate
and for foreclosure of the lien, on the ground that title to real estate is
involved. That appeal had been transferred to the supreme court by the
Kansas City Court of Appeals1 on the ground that the decree appealed
8. 273 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1954).
9. 269 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. 1954).
10. 272 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. 1954).
1. 264 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. App. 1954).
8
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from granted to the plaintiff a life estate in the house and an easement
over the lands to a well on defendant's property, and that these elements
of the case involved title to real estate. The supreme court, however, did
not agree because, under the record, plaintiff's did not appeal from the
decree which gave them a life estate only in the land on which the house
they built was situated, and defendant conceded in answer, and also in
her brief, that the plaintiff had a life estate. The fact that the money
judgment was, by the decree, secured by lien on the real estate did not
convert the action into a title controversy. The case was re-transferred to
the court of appeals.
In State v. Mattingly'2 the appeal was in a quo warranto proceeding
where it was contended that the town or Exeter was not properly
incorporated and the persons holding the offices of Aldermen of the
City of Exeter had no title to such office. The court points out that title
to an office under the state is not in issue in the constitutional sense in
such a case because only the title to a city office is involved and a city
office is not an "office under this State" within the meaning of the
constitution. That case, accordingly was transferred to the court of
appeals. Upon somewhat similar reasoning the court transferred the case
of State v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company'3 because the
action did not involve the County of St. Louis but only involved the
County Judges, or those performing their functions. The fact that the
action was against them in their official capacity and character "does
not make the County, as such, a party to the action and the appeal is not,
for this reason in this Court". The case was retransferred to the St. Louis
Court of Appeals.
RiGHT OF AppEAL
In Lawrence County v. Johnson,' 4 the defendants appealed from an
order overruling their motion to dismiss a petition in condemnation to
establish a roadway over their lands. The court held that there was no
final judgment in the case because the motion to dismiss presented a
number of issues which could not be decided upon matters appearing
upon the face of the petition but required evidence to support them.
Consequently, and because appeals may be taken only when the right
12. 268 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. 1954).
13. 273 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. 1954).
14. 269 S.W.2d 110 (Mo. 1954).
9
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to do so is authorized by statute, the court held that an appeal does not
lie from the overruling of a motion to dismiss a petition in a condemna-
tion suit and dismissed the appeal.
An interesting situation is presented in the case of Adair County
v. Urban.1' That was an action by Adair County for breach of contract
on a contractor's performance bond. There were two trials. The first
resulted in a judgment for plaintiff for $5,000, which judgment was set
aside on plaintiff's motion for new trial on the sole ground that the sum
awarded was inadequate. On the first appeal'0 it was decided that
plaintiff made a case for the jury and the cause was returned to the
trial court for a trial on damages only. Before the second trial,
defendant moved for a change of venue, the judge of the trial court
disqualified himself, and called in another circuit judge in Adair County
to try the case as special judge. In the second trial, before the special
judge, the jury rendered a verdict for $4,000 and judgment for that
amount was entered. Defendant did not file a motion for new trial
or any after trial motion. Plaintiff did file a motion for new trial only
as to the amount of damages sustained. Within thirty days after the
entry of the judgment the special judge overruled plaintiff's motion
and, of his own motion, entered an order setting aside the verdict on
the sole ground that the motion for change of venue had divested the
Circuit Court of Adair County of jurisdiction and that the special
judge did not have jurisdiction to try the case. Judge Contding, in the
opinion for the majority of the court en banc, first held that the motion
for change of venue did not deprive Adair County of jurisdiction and
that the special judge was wrong in setting aside the judgment on that
ground. Having so decided, the court remanded the case to the circuit
court with directions to reinstate the judgment setting aside the $4,000
verdict. The principal question before the court was whether or not
the defendant was an aggrieved party and entitled to appeal from the
order of the special judge setting aside the judgment and granting a
new trial. When the appeal was before Division Number 2, Barrett,
Commissioner, wrote an opinion holding that defendant was not ag-
grieved, and not entitled to appeal, because the effect of the order
granting a new trial was such that defendant was not immediately
injured thereby and therefore not presently aggrieved in his legal
15. 268 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1954).
16. 250 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1952).
10
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rights by the particular judgment complained of. When the case
reached the court en banc, however, Judge Conkling, speaking for the
majority of the court, pointed out that the circumstances of the case
were such that defendant had a right to accept the verdict against him
for $4,000 and terminate the litigation and that, when the special judge
ordered a new trial on grounds which the defendant had not presented
by motion for new trial, the defendant was aggrieved within the
meaning of the statute relating to appeals.17 It is pointed out that the
new trial compelled by the order was neither sought nor asked nor
desired by the defendant and, because that order was founded upon an
invalid and erroneous basis, defendant had the right to appeal therefrom
and have the order set aside and have the judgment against him re-
instated. Judges Leedy and Tipton dissented, adopting the divisional
opinion as their dissent.
REcoiws AND BRIEFs
Among the requirements of the rule of the supreme court with
respect to the contents of briefs' s is the provision that the briefs of
appellant must set out the points relied upon, specifying the allegations
of error with citations of authority. That rule has now been in existence
for more than ten years. The court, in Ambrose v. M.F.A. Cooperative
Association,19 in an opinion by Tipton, J., for the court en banc, supple-
mented by separate concurring opinions of Judges Hyde and Conkling,
applied the extreme penalty of dismissal of the appeal where there was
a total failure to comply with the rule both in the statement of facts,
the specifications of error, the citations of authority, and in the argument.
Judge Tipton, in the opinion for the court states:
"In order for us to determine if the trial court erred in granting
a new trial and entering a judgment for respondent, it would
be necessary for this Court to study the transcript and, also, to
brief the various issues we find in the record, thereby this Court
becoming an advocate as well as a Court. We do not think
that the interest of justice imperatively requires us to perform
this labor in this case as balanced against the importance of
keeping this Court abreast of its docket."
In dismissing the appeal the hope was again expressed that the
17. Mo. REv. STAT. § 512.020 (1949).
18. Sup. Ct. Rule 1.08.
19. 266 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. 1954).
11
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briefs filed in the court in the future will be an aid to the court, as
they will be if the rule is followed. Judge Hyde, in his concurring
opinion, states that it is the primary duty of the court to respect the
rights of litigents and to minimize the number of cases disposed of on
procedural questions but states "there must be limits to our under-
taking to do work that counsel should have done on his brief." Judge
Conkling, in concurring, states that because of the volume and character
of the litigation now coming before the court it is more imperative than
it ever has been that counsel should comply with the rule and that the
time has come to dismiss appeals where the rule is violated. This appeal
is, indeed, a stern warning to the Bar to prepare briefs in accordance
with the simple and well founded of the rules of the court with respect
to their contents.
The same result was reached in Schoenhals v. Pahler,20 where the
appeal was dismissed because appellant's brief did not contain a fair
and concise statement of the facts, and the assignments of error under
points and authorities were wholly unsustained by the record and were
not within the issues made by the pleadings. Notwithstanding these
dismissals, however, the court, in Wilt v. Wateried,21 refused to dismiss
the appeal on the ground that the statement was not a fair statement of
the facts and omitted page references, the court commenting that the
transcript was short and that the defendant in his reply had substantially
corrected the omission mentioned. Again in Conser v. Atchison, T. &
Sf. Ry.,22 the brief of appellant did not comply with the rule, but the
court declined to dismiss the appeal and ruled the case on its merits
because it was "able to determine from the whole brief the allegations
of error and the points made under them, which present important
questions, and because we have decided other recent cases on the merits
where the situation was similar."
QuESTIoNs REIWALE
In Hall v. Brookshire,23 where the case had been transferred to
the court en banc after it had first been decided in division, one of the
parties filed additional briefs. The court denied the motion of opposing
parties to strike such additional briefs, pointing to the rule that, when
20. 272 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. 1954).
21. 273 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. 1954).
22. 266 S.W.2d 587 (Mo. 1954).
23. 267 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1954).
12
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a case has reached the court en banc its status is as though briefs had
never been filed and the parties are at liberty to file entirely new briefs
or permit the court to decide the case on the briefs filed in division.
Consequently, the motion to strike the additional brief was overruled.
In Hammond v. Crown Coach Company,24 the trial court had entered
an order sustaining the motion for new trial without specifying the
grounds therefore; but, on the same day, filed in the case a six page docu-
ment headed "findings of fact and opinion". On the same day the notice of
appeal from the order sustaining the plaintiff's motion for new trial
was filed. The court held that the so-called findings of fact and opinion
were no part of the record in the case and that the order sustaining the
motion for new trial, because it did not specify the ground upon which
the motion was sustained, could not be affirmed upon the ground that the
trial court exercised its discretion and power. The conclusion reached
by the court was that an instruction, which was the principal complaint
on appeal, was not patently erroneous as a matter of law and that the
new trial could not be sustained upon the theory that the trial court, in
its discretion, had ordered the new trial because of the instruction.
CRIMINAL LAW
WIL IAM J. CASON*
Again the cases in the field of Criminal Law were a large percentage
of the work of the Supreme Court of Missouri for the year 1954. Most
of the cases considered well settled questions of law with only slight
variation from unquestioned principles. However, there are a number
of cases construing statutes never before construed by the court which
should be considered along with several cases in which the ingenuity
of counsel presented the court with unique and interesting propositions.
24. 263 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1954).
*Prosecuting Attorney, Clinton, Mo. B. S., University of Missouri, 1948, LL.B.
13
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No Missouri appellate court prior to this year has ruled on the ques-
tion of whether a person could commit larceny by an innocent third party
agent. The situation was presented to the supreme court in State v.
Patton.' Oliver Patton verbally informed one Andy Weisner that certain
concrete blocks stored on a farm on which Patton resided were Pattons
and that he wished to sell the same. Weisner desired to purchase the
blocks and did pay Patton $35.00 for them. Patton informed Weisner of
the location of blocks and told him he could pick them up at his con-
venience but that he would not be home when he got them. Weisner did
in fact pick up the blocks and take them to his farm. The blocks were
the property of Irvin De Woskin. Defendant was charged with larceny2
in an information which charged that he "unlawfully and feloniously did
steal take and carry away with intent to deprive the owner of the use
thereof and to convert the same to his own use" 465 concrete building
blocks.
Defendant was convicted of the charge and sentenced to two years
in the penitentiary. On his appeal he asserts that he can not be guilty of
larceny because he did not "steal take and carry away" the blocks in
question. Defendant's theory analyzed apparently is that though he may
have had the intent that the owner of the blocks be permanently de-
prived of the use thereof, nevertheless, he himself did no "taking" and he
cannot be guilty of larceny since there was no criminal act coupled with
his intent.
There is a division of authority concerning the question presented.
Many states hold that under the above circumstances a fraud has been
committed but the defendant is not guilty of larceny or theft because the
essential element of asportation is lacking, the defendant not having
obtained at any time actual or constructive possession of the property.
Other states have held that under the above circumstances the theft or
larceny is complete on the theory that the innocent purchaser is the agent
of the defendant. The Missouri Supreme Court adopted the latter view
in the instant case.
1. 271 S.W.2d 560 (Mo. 1954).
2. Mo. Rzv. STAT. § 560.155 (1949).
[Vol. 20
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B. Embezzlement
An interesting question was raised in a prosecution for embezzle-
ment.3 Defendant had rented a car from a car rental firm and failed to
return it. The rental period was supposed to end before August 1, 1952.
The information charged the time of the crime as on or about August 1,
1952. Defendant took the position on the appeal that since he did not have
possession of the car on August 1, 1952 with permission of the owner, the
rental period having expired, his possession at that time was tortious
and he could not be guilty of an embezzlement but larceny, if anything.
The court recognized the distinction raised by the defendant but held
that larceny, embezzlement and obtaining money under false pretenses
stand on an equal footing, the distinction resting in the time of forming
the criminal intent, and that where the criminal acts of a defendant would
support a conviction on any of the theories the court would not draw
fine hair-splitting distinctions and go into the question of at just what
moment the criminal intent was formed.
C. Exposing Poisonous Substance To Domestic Animals
It would appear that the legislature at its earliest convenience should
legislate to fill a gap created by the case of State v. Getty4 concerning
an interpretation of Section 560.380, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949),
which is commonly referred to as the animal poisoning law. There have
been a great number of persons prosecuted under this law who have
paid fines and even served jail sentences for poisoning dogs. The statute
was probably used more to prosecute persons who poisoned dogs than any
other animal. The statute provides in part as follows: "or shall mal-
iciously expose any poisonous substance, with intent that the same shall
be taken or swallowed by any cattle, hog, sheep, goat, horse, mule, ass or
other domestic animal or domestic fowl." It has heretofore been assumed
by prosecutors and attorneys for the defendants alike that a dog was a
domestic animal within the meaning of the statute. The court in the
above case ruled that though dogs were animals and were domesticated
it did not believe the legislature intended to punish the poisoner of dogs
by the statute and that the information charging as it did the exposing
of the poisonous substance to a dog did not charge that a crime had been
committed.
3. State v. Russell, 265 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. 1954).
4. 273 &W.2d 170 (Mo. 1954).
15
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D. Possession Of Obscene Publication
One Harold Becker was apprehended with a quantity of magazines
of a type not infrequently found on any large city news stand concerning
nudism. He was charged under Sec. 563.280, Missouri Revised Statutes
(1949), with possession of obscene publications for the purpose of selling
the same. The question presented to the court on review was whether
these publications were of the type prohibited by the statute. The court
stated that the test to be applied was whether the material being sold was
of such a nature to arouse the lustful desire of those open to such in-
fluence and into whose hands the publication might come. Since the
magazines in question had photographs of naked men and women of
mature years they were thought by the court to meet the requisite test.
Defendants conviction and penalty were sustained.5
E. Tampering With A Motor Vehicle
A broken down 1937 Chevrolet bus was parked behind a garage.
The owner and garage operator stated that he merely used the vehicle
to obtain parts therefrom and that it would not propel itself and that he
never intended to use the bus for driving again at any time. There was
no license on the bus so that it could be driven on the highway. Orville
Ridinger was charged with "tampering" with the motor vehicle in
question in violation of Section 560.175, Missouri Revised Statutes,
(1949), because it was alleged that he removed a tire and wheel from
the bus.6 The defendant after conviction and on the appeal took the
position that the vehicle in question was not a "motor vehicle" within the
meaning of that term as used in the above mentioned statutes since it was
not self propelled and the owner never intended that it should ever be.
The court noted that if vehicles such as this were not "motor vehicles" a
great many of similar type vehicles which were in junk yards and parked
around garages would be without the protection of the "tampering"
section and held such was not the legislative intent. Under this decision,
if the object in question was once or ever could be a motor vehicle it is
apparently within the protection of the "tampering" section above noted.
5. State v. Becker, 272 S.W2d 283, 286 (Mo. 1954): "Even judges may know what
falls within the classification of the decent, the chaste and the pure in either
social life or in publications, and what must be deemed obscene and lewd and
immoral and scandalous and lascivious."
6. State v. Ridinger, 266 S.W.2d 626 (Mo. 1954).
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F. Bribery
In State v. Brown7 the defendant was a city councilman of Spring-
field, Missouri. After having voted favorably for a proposal that would be
of considerable benefit to an engineering firm the defendant accepted a
gift of $1000.00 from the firm. Absolutely no showing of a prior agree-
ment to pay the money for the vote was shown. Defendant was filed on
under Section 558.020 (2) for accepting a bribe. Defendant on the appeal
contends that the acceptance by a public officer of a gift after an official
act is consummated without any prior corrupt understanding does not
constitute the acceptance of a bribe. The court ruled otherwise and in-
dicated that even if the defendant had cast his vote with the purest of
intentions and had no intent at the time to solicit a gratuity from the
engineering firm he would still be guilty if he later accepted the gratuity.
The decision in one sense is difficult to analyze from the point of view
of finding the criminal act and criminal intent coinciding at a given time,




1. Proof Of Prior Convictions Under Habitual Criminal Act
In State v. Abbott8 the defendant was charged by information with
the offense of larceny of a motor vehicle of the value of more than $30.00,1
together with four prior convictions under the habitual criminal act.10
The punishment assessed by the jury was 25 years imprisonment in the
penitentiary which is the maximum punishment fixed for the crime.
The verdict of the jury stated that:
"We, the jury find the defendant guilty and assess his punish-
ment at twenty five years in the Missouri Penitentiary."
There was no specific finding by the jury that the defendant has
been convicted and discharged of a prior felony even though the
maximum penalty was assessed. Defendant assigns that as error, assert-
ing that a verdict finding the maximum penalty as directed by the instruc-
7. 267 S.W.2d 682 (Mo. 1954).
8. State v. Abbott, 265 S.W.2d 316 (Mo. 1954).
9. Mo. Rn'. STAT. § 560165 (1949).
10. Mo. REv. STAT. § 556.280 (1949).
17
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tion concerning the habitual criminal act should also state a finding of
the prior conviction. The court held that the defendant has not been
prejudiced since the jury could have assessed the penalty which was
assessed without in fact believing and finding that defendant had been
convicted of the prior felony and discharged.
2. Confessions and Admissions
An interesting and unique question was presented concerning the
propriety of allowing the state to present evidence of admissions of a
person other than the defendant being tried in the case of State v.
Swindell." Swindell was originally charged jointly along with one Olin
Ward with forcible rape.' 2 A severence was taken and Swindell was
tried separately. During the trial of Swindell evidence was presented
concerning statements of Ward which were admissions against interest
and which were not made in the presence of Swindell. This was objected
to by defendant's counsel. The court held that there was a reasonable
inference of a conspiracy between Swindell and Ward and even though
no conspiracy was charged between the two that under these circum-
stances the admissions were properly admitted.
The court reaffirmed previous holdings to the effect that, even
though a defendant is in custody and has not been notified of his con-
stitutional rights and that any thing he might say might be used against
him, admissions of guilt made freely and without coercion are admiss-
able.13
B. Argument Of Counsel
There were several cases treating of the argument of counsel which
should be considered. In one situation 4 the defendant was charged with
forcible rape.' 5 He alleged insanity as a defense. The evidence showed
that the defendant had actually been committed to an institution in
another state and discharged therefrom prior to the commission of the
instant offense. Insanity was submitted to the jury as defendant's de-
fense. The prosecuting attorney in his final argument to the jury stated:
11. 271 S.W.2d 533 (Mo. 1954).
12. Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.260 (1949).
13. State v. Mayberry, 272 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. 1954).
14. State v. Johnson, 267 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Mo. 1954).
15. Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.260 (1949).
18
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"What good would it do you gentlemen to send him-to find him
not guilty by reason of insanity and send him to another hospital.
he would be out in two months."
The supreme court found that prosecutor was in fact urging the jury
to convict the defendant even though they might find that he was insane
at the time of the commission of the offense and that this was reversible
error.
In State v. Sanchez8 the prosecuting attorney in his argument said
of the defendant that he was a bloodsucker, pimp, lice of our society and
the lowest form of humanity. It was held not to be reversible error to
discharge the jury in light of such argument.
The prosecuting attorney in one case' 7 argued that:
"When the state closed the evidence, what did the defense offer.
They offered no evidence at all."
Counsel for defense moved for a mistrial on the ground that this
was an improper comment of the defendants failure to testify.' 8 The
court held that if the prosecuting attorney in fact, either directly or in-
directly refers to the defendants failure to testify he is entitled to a new
trial but that the statute is limited to its express terms and if the argu-
ment did not in point of fact refer to his failure to testify the statutory
prohibition has not been violated. Constitutional rights of the defendant
were not discussed. This case goes about as far as any have in allowing
the states counsel to infer some guilt from the defendants failure to
testify.
Referring to defendant in argument in a manslaughter case as a
"drunken killer" was held to be not error.Y9
The prosecuting attorney in State v. Charles20 in his argument
likened the defendant to a cancer and the jury as a doctor and said
"These lawless individuals, they are cancerous growths and you are
taking them out of the community." The court admitted the remarks
were severe but thought they were not so prejudicial as to call for a
reversal.
16. 269 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. 1954).
17. State v. Hayzlett, 265 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1954).
18. Mo. REv. STAT. § 546.270 (1949).
19. State v. Eison, 271 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1954).
20. 268 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. 1954).
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C. Conduct of Jury
While being interrograted on voir dire in a larceny prosecution 21 a
juror remarked in answer to a question put to him and in the presence
of the panel "I don't think I can give a theif a fair trial." Defendant's
counsel promptly asked that the panel be quashed and a mistrial declared.
The trial court refused to do this but did instruct the jury panel to dis-
regard the statement. The supreme court held that defendant was not
prejudiced because the panel was not quashed.
D. Instructions
An instruction given on behalf of the state in a forcible rape case
concerning the defense of insanity which had been interposed by the
defendent was held to be reversible error.22 The instruction was in part
as follows:
"The Court instructs the jury that insanity is interposed by
counsel of the defendant as an excuse for the charge set forth in
the information..."
Defendant assigned error in the giving of the instruction on the
ground that it disparaged his defense of insanity when the word "excuse"
was used. The appellate court agreed with defendants view of the use of
this word and stated that the instruction might readily be understood by
the jury as a disparaging comment on the defendants defense of insanity
and as such was highly prejudicial to defendant and reversible error.
A burden of proof instruction concerning the proof of insanity as a
defense was held to be error because it required the defendant to prove
his insanity to the "reasonable satisfaction" of the jury.28
In a prosecution for tampering with a motor vehicle2 4 the defendant's
counsel stated "I want the record to show that I requested an instruction
defining 'tampering' ". However, defendant did not offer such an instruc-
tion. The supreme court noted that there is a duty upon the trial court to
instruct the jury in writing upon all questions of law arising in the case
as to which the jury must have information to reach their verdict. It
might seem that if the jury must find that a defendant "tampered" with
21. State v. Weidlich, 269 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1954).
22. State v. Johnson, 267 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1954).
23. State v. Johnson, 267 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1954).
24. State v. Wood, 266 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. 1954).
20
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a motor vehicle perhaps the jury should be advised as to what constitutes
tampering under the law. The court held otherwise but with no apparent
discussion of the precise question presented.
II. PROCEDURE BFoRE TRIAL
The tendency of some trial judges at times to indicate their feeling
concerning the defendant's guilt or what the verdict should be was de-
nounced by the court in one case.25 The court, prior to the actual trial
of the cause and during the selection of the jury, informed the jury panel
that the information filed was originally against three defendants and
that one had already pleaded guilty. This was objected to by counsel for
the defendant and properly preserved and assigned as error in the
supreme court. The court held this action by the trial judge to be rever-
sible error and stated that:
"The rule is well settled that a fair trial exacts absolute impar-
tiality on the part of the judge as to both his conduct and re-
marks... A judge must not say anything that can be construed
by the jury to the prejudice of a defendant."
Even though the record on appeal from a burglary conviction was
entirely silent as to whether the defendant has been arraigned properly
or at all the court found this not to be grounds for a reversal in the case
of State v. Turner.20 The record did show the trial as if the defendant had
entered a plea of not guilty. The court ruled that the failure of a showing
of a formal arraignment under these circumstances was not prejudicial to
the defendant.
IV. APPEALs
Again in numerous cases the supreme court has emphasized that
the defendant's motion for new trial must state specifically and with
particularity the alleged error.27 In State v. Weed"- the defendant stated
in his motion for new trial that an instruction was confusing, argumenta-
tive, assumed facts, commented on the evidence and submitted evidence
25. State v. Castino, 264 S.W.2d 372 (Mo. 1954).
26. State v. Turner, 272 S.W.2d 266 (Mo. 1954).
27. Sup. Ct. Rule 27.20, § 547.030; State v. Mayberry, 272 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. 1954);
State v. Gerberding, 272 S.W.2d 230 (Mo. 1954); State v. Weed, 271 S.W.2d 557
(Mo. 1954); State v. Eison, 271 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1954).
28. 271 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1954).
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erroneously admitted. This allegation was held too general to preserve
any error for review.
An interesting analysis of the state's right and method of appeal
is found in State v. Getty,29 wherein the prosecuting attorney followed
the procedure outlined in Supreme Court Rule 28.06 in appealing from
an order of the trial court quashing an information filed. The defendant
moved to dismiss the appeal for the reason that the prosecutor did not
follow the statutory provision ° for the state taking an appeal which is a
completely different method than that provided by the above noted
rule of court. Defendant relied upon Article 5, Section 5 of the Constitu-
tion which provides in effect that the court can establish for all courts
rules of practice and procedure that do not change substantive rights
or effect the right of appeal. The court held that the rule in question did
not change the "right of appeal" but only the "mode"of appeal and that
the prosecutor could elect to follow the procedure outlined in the rule
rather than the statutory provision.
THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
WILTIAm H. BEcKER, JR.
[Editor's Note. Mr. Becker has already reviewed most of the 1954
cases in this field in the January issue of the Review (20 Missouri Law




During 1954, the Supreme Court dealt with only a few cases pri-
marily involving insurance law. Old Reliable Atlas Life Society v. Leg-
gett1 is a case which appears to be of limited interest to the profession
29. 273 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1954).
30. Mo. RPv. STAT. § 547.210 (1949).
*Attorney, Joplin, Missouri. L.L.B. University of Missouri, 1935.
1. 265 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. 1954).
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generally. It was a declaratory judgment action relating to the operation
of stipulated premium life insurance and the extent of the supervisory
powers of the Superintendent of Insurance over such insurance com-
panies. The Supreme Court affirmed the declaration of the trial court to
the effect that Sections 377.200-460, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949)
relating to stipulated premium plan life insurance companies, are not a
complete code, but that such companies are subject to the general regula-
tory powers of the Superintendent of Insurance. The death losses for the
first year on the limited payment policies were not to be paid out of the
insurance fund prescribed by Section 377.260, Missouri Revised Statutes
(1949), and the initial premium was not a part of such fund but con-
stituted a trust or reserve fund. It was also held that policy fees exacted
by the agent from the insured when application was made for the insur-
ance were a part of the premium for the first policy year and were suf-
ficient, along with the first year's premium, to carry the insurance over
into the second year, so that a portion would become part of the insurance
fund. Plaintiff had assumed certain "membership and benefit certificates"
issued by its predecessors. These were held to be limited payments life
insurance policies, as to which the Superintendent of Insurance was
authorized to compel plaintiff to provide the funds necessary for the
reserve provided for by Section 377.270, which plaintiff had contended
it need not do.
State ex rel. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v.
Weber2 is a case where a liability insurance company attempted to
intervene in a circuit court damage suit and, the case coming to the
Missouri Supreme Court upon application for a writ of mandamus,
the supreme court held the insurance company had no right to intervene.
The insurance company had issued a garage liability policy to an
automobile dealer and garage owner, who had sold a truck to an
individual, who in turn permitted his son to drive the truck, as a result
of which an automobile accident occurred, injuring the plaintiff in the
damage suit. For some reason or on some grounds which do not appear
in the opinion, the operator of the truck took the position that he was
an "additional insured" under the terms of the garage liability policy,
and hence the insurance company attempted to intervene and engraft
onto the circuit court action a declaratory judgment action seeking a
2. 273 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. 1954).
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declaration as to the rights to the parties in the policy and a decree that
the insurance company was not obligated to defend the truck driver
in the damage suit.
The supreme court took the position that inasmuch as the insurance
company could later litigate the question of whether it was liable for
any judgment that might be obtained against the truck driver in the
damage suit, its interest in the damage suit was only "remote and
contingent". The terms and provisions of the garage liability policy
do not appear in the opinion, but if it was a standard type policy, then
the insurance company would have the right to defend, through its
representatives, a suit brought against an "additional insured". Perhaps
this point should have been brought to the attention of the court. It is
quite possible that the insurance company might make a much more
vigorous defense of the damage suit than would the individual who was
claiming to be an "additional insured", and the result, if the suit were
defended by the insurance company representatives, might well be a
much smaller judgment than would otherwise be the case. These facts
are commonly known among lawyers and courts in damage suit litigation
and to this extent, at least, it seems that the interest of the insurance
company in the defense of the damage suit would not be "remote and
contingent", but would be very direct and immediate.
The opinion also makes the point that the named insured in the
policy, the garageman, was not a party to the damage suit. It is difficult
to see where this is material, because the person who was claiming to
be an "additional insured", the truck driver, was a party to the damage
suit, being the defendant therein, and under the terms of the policy, as
an "additional insured", if he was such, he would be just as much of an
insured as the named insured himself.
The opinion makes the point that the plaintiff in the damage suit
action should be entitled to choose his opponent and have his claim for
damages against the defendant determined without being interfered
with by the insurance company. However, it would appear that the
trial court could have determined the coverage aspects of the situation,
with relatively little delay, and then after that, could have proceeded
with the trial of the damage suit. Furthermore, if the case is a proper
one for interevention, then our statutes have, to that extent, at least,
deprived a plaintiff of what would otherwise be his unincumbered right
to select whatever defendant he sees fit and proceed against that
24
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defendant without interruption from outside sources. In other words,
the plaintiff has that right only if it is the sort of a case where someone
else does not have the right to intervene.
As a practical matter, the result of the case is about the same as if the
jsurance company had tried to file a declaratory judgment suit after
the damage suit had been filed first, and then sought to get injunctive
relief to stay the prosecution of the damage suit until the subsequently
filed declaratory judgment suit was disposed of. As a general rule, in
such instances courts will not stay a prior damage suit. On the other
hand, where the insurance company files its declaratory judgment suit
first, and gets all the proper parties into court, then it usually is able
to stay the proceedings of a subsequent independent damage suit until
the coverage question is settled.
In Kreuger v. Schmiechen3, the court adherred to its previous
holdings that the fact a defendant carries liability insurance does not
enlarge his liability in tort action. The defendants were members of
the Consistory, or board of directors of the charitable institution, a




During the past year, the Missouri appellate courts have had to
deal with cases involving labor-management relations in ever increasing
numbers. As has been indicated in earlier writings,1 the Garner case2 is
contnuing to have great influence over the role which the state court
may play in labor relations involving interstate commerce. The main
holding of that case was that the federal government has pre-empted the
field of labor relations involving unfair labor practices from interference
by the state courts.
3. 264 S.W2d 311 (Mo. 1954).
*Attorney, Kansas City. A.B., 1950, LLB., 1952, University of Missouri.
1. Shute, State versus Federal Jurisdiction in Labor Disputes, 19 Mo. L. REV.
119 (1954).
2. 346 US. 485, 74 Sup. Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 161 (1953).
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The recent case of Weber v. Anheuser-Busch3 added somewhat to the
Supreme Court holding in the Garner case, and may be almost as im-
portant in its ramifications as the Garner case itself. For the Anheuser-
Busch case not only echoed the holding of the Garner case, it went
further. It held that even though the particular action complained of
may not be an unfair labor practice, yet the state court might still be
precluded from jurisdiction. This, on the theory that the action might
be such action as was meant to be protected by the federal act. Assume,
for example, certain action might violate state law-for instance, the
Missouri conspiracy in restraint of trade laws.4 Even though the
action might not be an unfair labor practice, the state court might still
not have jurisdiction if the action was such as was intended to be
protected by Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act.5
The Anheuser-Busch case involved a jurisdictional dispute between
a machinists union, the certified bargaining representative of the
Anheuser-Busch employees, and the millwrights. When Anheuser-
Busch let work to outside contractors, as it frequently did, the machinists
wanted a clause in their collective bargaining agreement providing that
such work would only be given to contractors who employed members
of the machinists union. The millwrights protested, and the company
refused to include the clause, although such a clause had been in
previous contracts. The machinists struck, and picketed the plant.
The company promptly did two things: it filed an unfair labor prac-
tice charge against the union based on an alleged violation of Section 8 (b)
(4) (D) 6 of the Labor Management Relations Act; and obtained a
restraining order against the picketing in the state court. The petition
for the restraining order alleged not only violations of Section 8 (b) (4)
(D), but also violations of Sections 8 (b) (4) (A) 7 and (B) 8 of the
3. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
4. Mo. REV. STAT. § 416.010 (1949); and see Shute, A Survey of Missouri Labor
Law, 18 Mo. L. REv. 95 at 110-133 (1953).
5. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. (1947).
6. "... forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees
in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to
employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class . . ."
7. ". . . forcing or requiring any employer ... to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor
or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person...
8. "... . forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a labor
organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has
been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of Section
9.. !'
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federal Act. In addition, an amended petition alleged an illegal conspiracy
in restraint of trade under the Missouri law.
The labor Board found no violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (D) of the
Act, but not before the union had appealed the lower court decision to
the Missouri supreme court. The state supreme court upheld the finding
of the lower court on the grounds of an illegal conspiracy in restraint of
trade in violation of Missouri law." The United State Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 10
Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the majority opinion, pointed out
that the federal Act had not intended to prohibit all picketing, but
merely that picketing which the Act designated as unlawful. Other
picketing was intended to be free and lawful. He quoted from the Garner
case: 11 "For the state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed
to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state
were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which the
federal Act prohibits."' 2
And further: "... even if it were clear that no unfair labor practices
were involved, it would not necessarily follow that the State was free
to issue its injunction. If this conduct does not fall within the prohibitions
of Section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act, it may fall within the protection
of Section 7, as concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid or
protection."'13
The Court pointed out that here was a case where the plaintiff
had alleged in their state court petition violations of the federal legislation
other than the one charge which they had filed with the Board. The
Board was empowered to deal merely with the one charge filed with it.
The fact that no violation was found by the Board as to that particular
charge did not mean that the other charges were not valid.
The portion of the decision dealing with the pre-emption of the
field from state interference as to unfair labor practices has been
established law since the Garner case. But, it will be interesting to
observe the way in which this new area of protected activity from
9. 264 Mo. 573, 265 S.W.2d 325 (1954).
10. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 808 (1955).
11. Garner v. Teamsters Local No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 499 (1953).
12. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468, 475 (1955).
13. Id., at 478.
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state interference will develop. The Supreme Court has made it clear
that the mere fact the activity is not an unfair labor practice does not
mean that the state court may assert jurisdiction and issue its injunction
on the grounds of a violation of state law.
The case of Jack Cooper Transportation Company v. Stufflebeam,14
was decided on the basis of the Garner and Anheuser-Busch decisions.
The picketing was allegedly directed to coerce the company to recognize
the union as the bargaining agent for the employees without proper
certification from the Board.15 The lower state court had issued the
restraining order, but the Missouri Supreme Court held that the lower
court had no jurisdiction. Again, then, we have a definite holding by
the supreme court that where the petition alleges unfair labor practices,
the state court has no jurisdiction to issue its restraining order.
In McAmis v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company,16 the problem
of state and federal jurisdiction was again raised, although the case is
more important for its holding that there may be specific performance
of an arbitrator's award.
In that case, the company and union had submitted a discharge case
to arbitration. The union alleged in its grievance that the discharge was
unjust in that the employee was not guilty of the acts charged, that
discharge was too severe a punishment for the infraction alleged, and
that the employee was discharged because of union activities. In addition
to filing the grievance, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the Board on the grounds that the employee, McAmis, was
discharged solely because of certain union activities.' 7 The arbitration
ended in a unanimous award in favor of McAmis, and directed the
company to rehire him without back pay. The company refused.
The union then brought a suit in the state court for specific perform-
ance of the arbitrator's award. Prior to a decision by the lower court,
the unfair labor practice charge was dismissed. The lower court issued
its order to the company, ordering it to cease and desist from refusing
further to obey the order of the arbitration panel.
14. 280 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. Sup. 1955).
15. Supra, note 8.
16. 273 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. App. 1954).
17. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) "... by discrimination in regard
to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization..
[Vol. 20
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The company contended that since McAmis had alleged unfair labor
practice charges before the Board, the arbitration panel had no jurisdic-
tion over the grievance. It was argued that the sole jurisdiction was
with the Board. The union argued that the question was not whether
there was an unfair labor practice, but whether or not McAnis was
guilty of the misconduct charged and whether or not discharge was
too severe a punishment for any alleged misconduct. The arbitration
panel had obviated any unfair labor practice question by its finding
that McAmis may have been guilty of some of the misconduct alleged,
but that discharge was too severe under the circumstances.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals pointed out that at the arbitration
hearing, neither side introduced any evidence other than that having to
do with whether or not McAmis was guilty of the misconduct alleged.
The court pointed out that the situation involved one where in their
collective bargaining agreement, the company and union had agreed
to submit to arbitration all grievances, including grievances involving
unfair labor practices as well as grievances not involving such charges,
and to be bound by the decision of the arbitrators.
The court pointed out that Congress had not intended to make all
disputes between labor and management subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Board, but merely those involving unfair practices.
The court held that as to that part of the grievance alleging an unfair
labor practice, the arbitration panel had no jurisdiction. But as to the
rest of the grievance, there was no question of the right of the panel to
arbitrate the issue.
The court stated: 18 "There are no decisions, Federal or State, that
have come to our attention, which clearly mark the way for us to follow
in disposing of this question. However, as a general rule, public policy
favors the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements, or contracts,
fixing conditions of employment between labor-and management. And
the enlightened view is that the best interests of labor, management, and
the public will best be served by arbitration of such disputes as may
arise under bargaining agreements except in such cases as may be
excepted by legislative enactment. That is the policy which is emerging
in this extremely important, comparatively new, and developing field
of the law."
18. 273 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Mo. App. 1954).
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In sustaining the lower court's decree of specific performance,
the court held that: 19 "An employee should be entitled to assert both
defenses to his claim unlawful discharge, the one in the forum agreed
upon between himself and his employer-the other in the forum desig-
nated by Congress. There is nothing inconsistent in such a course, nor
can there be any conflict of jurisdiction or authority, the reason given in
the Garner case for the rule of exclusive jurisdiction."
It is difficult to see how the court could have come to any other
decision without completely disrupting the theories of arbitration of
grievances between labor and management as they have existed in
the past.
An interesting case involving the right of a barbershop owner to
display a "union shop" card was considered in Kerkemeyer v. Midkiff.2
This was a declaratory judgment action brought by certain barbershop
owners who also worked as barbers in their own shops. The union
had made a demand on these owner-workers that they would either
have to join the union or return their "union shop" card. The laws
of the union required that no member of the union could work in a shop
which did not display the union card. The effect, then, of such a demand,
would be a compulsory walk out on the part of the union barbers in their
employ.
For many years, the owners of these shops had had collective
bargaining agreements with the barbers union, and agreed therein to
abide by the laws, present or future, governing the display of the
"union shop" card. The union had never demanded that the shop
owners belong to the union. The constitution of the union was then
amended to require that all persons working in a shop must belong to
the union. The demand on the shop owners followed.
The majority of the court held that the "union shop" card was a
property right belonging to the union, and that the provision in the
collective bargaining agreements, whereby the shop owners agreed to
abide by the rules regarding display of the "union shop" card, was en-
forceable. It was held that requiring the shop owners to belong to
the union if they worked in the shop was not an unlawful union activity.
19. Id. at 794.
20. 281 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. App. 1955).
[Vol. 20
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It was held not against the public policy of the State of Missouri for
the union to demand that the shop owners, if they worked in the shop,
belong to the union.
The dissent argued that such a requirement was not a lawful union
activity and was against the public policy of the State of Missouri. The
obvious difficulties inherent in the situation of an employer belonging
to and being bound by the rules of a union were pointed out. Further, it
was argued that neither party could reasonably be found to have
intended, at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining
agreement, that the shop owners would be required to join the union.
This is a very difficult case to understand. From the standpoint
of the union, they expect, and perhaps rightly so, that if a man does union
work, he should belong to the union. From the standpoint of the shop
owner, he has traditionally worked as a barber without being a member
of the union, and expects to be treated as an employer, rather than a
union member. From the standpoint of the public, such a situation
completely disrupts collective bargaining and peaceful labor-management
relations. If one is economically realistic, it will be recognized that a
barber shop is not such a lucrative craft that the owner can afford to
sit back and merely manage. As to the "union shop" card, the fact of
criminal liability on the part of one falsely displaying a "union shop"
card cannot be ignored.2 1
Certainly, the court in such a situation as this should be more
concerned with making good labor-management law than with traditional
concepts of contract law. The problem is to determine what is good and
what is bad in this field, and whether what is good for one craft or
industrial group might not be bad for another.
A recent case deciding the liabilities involved during the period of
state seizure of the Kansas City Public Service Company in 1950 was
handed down by the Missouri Supreme Court in Rider v. Vance Julian
and Kansas City Public Service Company.22
This case arose when operators of the Kansas City Public Service
Company's streetcars and busses struck. Under the authority vested
in the Governor of the State of Missouri by the King-Thompson Act,2 3
21. Mo. Itrv. STAT. § 417.060 (1949).
22. Supreme Court of Missouri, en bane, April Session, 1955.
23. Mo. Rzv. STAT. § 295.010 et. sea.
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the utility was seized by the State. During the period of state seizure,
plaintiff Rider suffered a personal injury alleged to have been due to
the negligence of one of the streetcar company's operators. The
company alleged that they were not liable, since the state was operating
the utility at the time of the alleged negligence. The lower court
backed up this contention, on the theory that the seizure was an actual
seizure and not merely a token one.24
The main issue in the case was whether or not the relationship of
employer and employee arose as between the state and the employees
of the streetcar company during the period of seizure. The court
held that it did not on two theories: (1) there was no contract of
bmployment, either express or implied, between the state and the
operating personnel of the railway; (2) the state did not exercise such
control over the physical operation of the utility as to impose liability
for the tortious acts of the personnel under common law.
The state seizure was held to have been nominal or technical pos-
session and not an actual one. The court pointed out that the management
of the company remained the same, and the revenues derived from the
operation of the company were channeled in the usual manner. The
acceptance by the company of the revenues was held to have been a
ratification of any of the tortious acts of their operators.
The question of the constitutionality of the King-Thompson Act
was not dealt with, since the court felt that any such determination was
not necessary or essential to a proper disposition of the case.
This appears to be the only practical way to dispose of the problem
presented by the torts committed by streetcar employees during the
period of state seizure. The Act has in it no provision for suit against
the state in such event. The company, for all practical purposes,
continued to operate the streetcars and motorbusses in exactly the same
way it had prior to seizure. The seizure was made in the public
interest, and so declared. Certainly, it would not be in the public
interest for the state to be committing torts against its citizens without
provision for liability therefor.
24. A Survey of Missouri Labor Law, 18 Mo. L. Rsv. 154-172 (1953).
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The final case to be discussed is Turner v. Emerson Electric
Manufacturing Company,2 5 a service letter case. 26 Here, a discharged
employee requested a service letter from his former superior executive
at the defendant plant. This individual, who had had dealings with
plaintiff in a number of instances, including his being laid off, his rehiring,
and various personnel problems, wrote to plaintiff that it was not the
policy of the company to issue service letters. On the jury finding for
the plaintiff, defendant appealed.
The principle problem here is whether or not a corporation can
be held liable for failure to issue a service letter when the request is made
to one who is neither superintendent or manager. The court held that
it could where, as here, the executive employee addressed could be
considered to be a superintendent or manager within the meaning of
the phrase, that is, one to whom the company has intrusted duties of a
supervisory or managerial nature.
The other issue, and on which the case was reversed and remanded,
involved the submission of actual malice to the jury when the evidence
did not so justify. The court defined actual malice as existing ".... when
one with a sedate, deliberate mind and formed design injures another,
as where the person is actuated by spite and ill will in what he does and
says, with a design willfully or wantonly to injure another .... 27 Legal
malice and actual malice were held not to be synonomous.
Thus, we find the Missouri appellate courts dealing more and more
with the rather complicated and dynamic field of labor law. Many
times, decisions have to be made with the benefit of very little, if any,
precedent. Pressures of all sorts are present, economic and political, as
well as social. The doctrine of stare decisis is of very little help, since
the concept of labor rights and management rights is as changeable as
the particular union or management craft or group dealt with. As
lawyers, we should be thankful we merely have to advocate one side or
the other of the various problems presented in this field. But, in our
advocacy, whether we represent labor or management, we should do all
possible to aid the courts in charting their way through the rough and
murky waters of labor law.
25. 280 S.W.2d 474 (Mo. App. 1955).
26. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 290.140 (1949).
27. 280 S.W.2d 474, 479.
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VENDoR'S REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR SALE
OF REAL ESTATE
Specific Performance in Lieu of Liquidated Damages
Robert Blond Meat Company v. Eisenberg' was a suit by a vendor
against a purchaser for specific performance of a contract for the sale
and purchase of real estate. The contract price was $51,000, with a down
payment in escrow of $1000 [the exact amount of the broker's commis-
sion], and with the balance at closing by $19,000 cash and a $31,000 4/27o
note secured by a purchase money deed of trust. The contract contained
the usual Kansas City clause2 with reference to remedies for breach, the
clause being printed except as to the words "as liquidated damages"
which were interlined by typewriter:
"If the seller has kept his part of this contract, and the buyer
fails to comply with the contract on his part as herein provided,
within five (5) days thereafter, then the money deposited as
aforesaid is forfeited by the buyer as liquidated damages, and
this contract may or may not be operative thereafter, at the
option of the seller."
Upon purchaser's refusal to close, the vendor brought suit for specific
performance. The trial court entered a decree ordering the purchaser
to pay $19,000 in cash and to execute a $31,000 4 % note for the balance
secured by a purchase money deed of trust, with adjustments for taxes,
insurance, rentals, and accrued interest on the note; the court expressly
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri, B.S., University of Illinois, 1935, L.L.B.,
1937; Sterling Fellow, Yale University, 1937-1938.
1. 273 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. 1954).
2. This form of clause (disregarding the typed interlineation) seems to be
the most popular form in current use in Kansas City. The "Official Form Approved
by Legal Counsel for the Real Estate Board of Kansas City, Mo.," copyright, 1953,
uses exactly the same clause. I have not inquired as to whether there has been any
change in Kansas City practice since the principal case was reported.
The clause in the principal case is substantially the same as the form in
VoLz et al, Vol. 1 MIssouRI PRACTICE § 73, p. 35 (1953).
A somewhat similar clause has been, and perhaps still is, very popular in St.
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retained jurisdiction to enter such orders as might be necessary to enforce
full compliance with the decree. On appeal this decree was affirmed in
an opinion by Hyde, J.
This would seem to be the first case in Missouri to hold that a vendor
may have specific performance, although there has been dicta to that
effect in earlier cases.3 The court does not indicate what sanctions may
be used to enforce the decree, but the court does answer several questions
with reference to the general problem of specific performance in favor
of a vendor.
Is the vendor's legal remedy of damages inadequate. The court took
the view that the vendor's legal remedy was inadequate, for the general
reasons mentioned in the Restatement of Contracts § 360, Comment c.
(1932) .4 In this case there was an added and special reason, the vendor's
right to a 4%% first mortgage note. Although specific performance is
discretionary, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in this case.
Does the liquidated damages clause preclude specific performance?
As drafted, the clause does not preclude specific performance, because
after providing for forfeiture of the down payment as liquidated damages,
it expressly goes on to provide: "and this contract may or may not be
operative thereafter, at the option of the seller." An additional reason is
that this particular clause provided no liquidated damages, because the
amount stipulated, $1000, was the same as the broker's commission;
$1000, leaving no surplus for the vendor; in effect, the liquidated damages
clause simply indemnified the vendor for the broker's commission. Under
the theory of the court, if the down payment had been large enough to
provide some liquidated damages for the vendor, that would not preclude
specific performance in the vendor's favor (in view of the express pro-
vision that the contract might be operative thereafter), but the case does
not suggest that the vendor may have both liquidated damages and
specific performance. If the provision for liquidated damages is really a
penalty, the vendor could not retain the down payment. If the provision
is a valid one for liquidated damages, presumably the vendor in seeking
specific performance. If the provision for liquidated damages is really a
payment or by offering to reduce the cash balance owing by the amount
of the down payment.
3. See Mo. DmG., Specific Performance, § 66.
4. Compare the attitude of the court in Rice v. Griffith, 349 Mo. 373, 383, 161
S.W.2d 220, 225 (1942), reversing s. c., 144 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. App. 1940).
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Practical conclusions: How large should a down payment be to pro-
vide sufficient liquidated damages? In the principal case the down
payment covered the broker's commission only and provided nothing
in addition for the vendor. In the ordinary transaction the typical down
payment has been 10%. Perhaps this is enough to provide reasonable
liquidated damages for the vendor when a broker's commission is 21/2%,
but with a broker's commission at 5% or more, the vendor is left with
5% or less, part of which must be used to cover costs of abstracting and
legal services. Lawyers should give serious consideration as to whether
the down payment (liquidated damages) should not be 121/% or 15%
in the ordinary case.
Should the vendor's right to specific performance be expressly ex-
cluded. In most cases the intention of the parties and their legitimate
interests would best be served by limiting the vendor to money damages,
liquidated or actual. In the case of a rare purchaser, a decree that the
purchaser specificially perform might be of value to the vendor, but in
most cases such a decree would not be a practical remedy. Damages,
actual or liquidated, would seem to be the more practical remedy, and of
course an adequate down payment in escrow to serve as liquidated
damages is largely self-executing. One Missouri text, after noting that a
forfeiture provision does not necessarily bar a suit by vendor for specific
performance, has this to say: "In representing a purchaser in a doubtful
purchase, it may be advisable to provide that the forfeiture of the down
payment, particularly when small, shall be the sole remedy of the
vendor." 5 A possible reason for not including such an express provision
is that a court may take the position (misapplying the concept of mutual-
ity of remedies) that the purchaser likewise is barred from specific
performance because of a lack of mutuality of remedies. In any event
if the vendor is not to have specific performance, the clause on vendor's
remedies should omit the words "and this contract may or may not be
operative thereafter, at the option of the seller."
5. Volz et al., 1 MIssoURI PRACTICE § 59 (1953).
6. A form set out in GILL, MissouR REAL ESTATE Formis, No. 101 (2d ed. 1931),
apparently in common use in St. Louis, provides: " . . . if purchaser wrongfully
refuses to close, earnest money is to be forfeited and half paid to agent in full of
commissions, and half to seller, and purchaser shall remain liable for balance of
purchase price, but shall not be entitled to enforce sale." I do not fully understand
just what end result this clause is designed to achieve, but if it is the intention to
limit the vendor to liquidated damages, the part beginning with the words "and
purchaser" should be omitted.
[Vol. 20
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In my opinion a better clause for liquidated damages for the vendor-
is as follows: "If this contract shall not be closed for the fault of the
Purchaser, the money in escrow shall be paid to the Vendor as liquidated
damages, it being agreed that actual damages are difficult if not impos-
sible to ascertain." 7 I doubt whether the vendor can sue for specific
performance in such a case and I am inclined to think that he is limited to
liquidated damages. It should be noted that the principal case does not
determine the effect of such a clause because the clause in the principal
case expressly provided that at the vendor's option the contract should
continue to be operative after "forfeiture" of the down payment and there
was no surplus in excess of the broker's commission to compensate the
vendor by way of liquidated damages.
Liquidated Damages as Penalty-Actual Damages
Wilt v. Waterfield8 was an action by a purchaser against a vendor to
recover actual damages in lieu of the liquidated damages provided in the
contract for sale of real estate. The contract included the following clause
with reference to remedies for breach:
If either party hereto fails or neglects to perform his part
of this agreement, he shall forthwith pay and forfeit as liquidated
damages to the other party a sum equal to ten percent of the
agreed price of sale, except that if said agreed price is less than
$2,000, said sum shall be $200.
Although liquidated damages would have been $1900, the trial court
awarded actual damages of $7000 and $700 accured interest. In an opinion
by Dew, Special Judge, the judgment was affirmed on the theory that the
clause in question provided for a penalty, not for liquidated damages, and
consequently actual damages could be recovered.
In the typical case the one defaulting contends that the liquidated
amount is a penalty, is excessive, and only a smaller amount of actual
damages should be recovered. The principal case is exceptional in that
the penalty construction results in the recovery of actual damages in a
much larger amount.
7. For a similar clause, see GILL, MissoumI REAL ESTATE Fonis No. 102 (2d ed.
1931), ["Seller... retaining all sums paid hereunder as and for liquidated damages,
damages for breach thereof being incipable of accurate ascertainment"].
8. 273 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. 1954).
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The theory applied in the principal case is that if a contract requires a
party to do a number of things, some of minor importance, some of major
importance, and provides for a single substantial amount of "liquidated
damages" for any breach, the amount being grossly disproportionate for
certain minor breaches, the provision is one for a penalty even though
the breach complained of is the ultimate breach as to which the amount is
reasonable.
The court interpreted the liquidated damages clause in the principal
case to mean that the breach could be any breach, including such things as
failure to deliver possession on a day certain, failure to convey the full
acreage, etc. The court relies principally on two Missouri cases, The first
is a 1923 Appeals case, Adams v. Luckman,9 which supports the principal
case. The other is the leading Missouri case, Morse v. Rathburn, which
in my opinion is contrary to the principal case and in effect is overruled
by the principal case.10
Whether or not Adams v. Luckaman and Wilt v. Waterfield, the
principal case, properly interpret the liquidated damages clauses in
question, it is clear that clauses of that type are now worthless in pro-
viding liquidated damages and should be avoided. The draftsman must
make it clear that the only breach calling for payment of the liquidated
damages is the ultimate breach, repudiation or failure to close. This
may be expressed (I trust) as follows: "If this contract shall not be
closed for the fault of the Purchaser," etc.
A clause providing for liquidated damages in the event of breach by
the vendor, as in the principal case, has another possible defect. Has the
purchaser thereby precluded himself from obtaining a decree of specific
9. 256 S.W. 103 (Mo. App. 1923). The clause provided: "if either party
thereto fails or refuses to perform his part of this contract, they shall pay to the
other the sum of $300 as liquidated damages for such failure." On vendor's failure
to close it was held the purchaser could not recover the $300 liquidated damages but
could recover only actual damages, if any. The court interpreted the clause as
applying to any one of six breaches, some insignificant, and therefore a penalty
clause.
10. 42 Mo. 594, 601, 97 Am. Dec. 359 (1868). The clause provided: "And the
said parties to this agreement bind themselves that either party failing to comply
with its provisions shall forfeit and pay to the other the sum of two thousand
dollars." The purchaser refused to close, and the court held that the vendor could
recover the $2000 liquidated damages, the amount being reasonable with reference
to actual and presumed damages for repudiations by the purchaser.
I am unable to distinguish the clauses in Adams v. Luckaman and Wilt v. Water-
field from the clause in Morse v. Rathburn.
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performance? The current case of Robert Blond Meat Company v. Eisen-
berg" noted above, suggests some answers to this problem.
"Forfeiture" of Stated Amount
The two cases noted above, Robert Blond Meat Company v. Eisen-
berg12 and Wilt v. Waterfield,13 make it necessary for the lawyer who
drafts contracts for the sale of real estate to reconsider his clause on
remedies for breach. In both cases the word "forfeit" is used, although
in each case the forfeiture is "as liquidated damages." It is true that in
most cases a provision that the deposit is "forfeited" or "forfeited as
liquidated damages" does not prevent the clause from being interpreted
as a "liquidated damages" clause, but in a close case the use of the word
"forfeit" might resolve doubt in favor of a penalty construction. It is
submitted that in redrafting these clauses the word "forfeit" should be
completely omitted, and the clause should provide simply for liquidated
damages as such, to be paid to vendor, retained by vendor, etc.
PossIBnIrrY or REVERTER-ALIENABILITY-LIMITATION
OVER-RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
In Donehue v. Nilges14 there was a 1908 grant of two acres out of a
larger tract to a school so long as used for a school site and no longer,
"and if the aforesaid premises be no longer used for a school house site,
then the aforesaid premises shall revert to and become the property of the
grantors herein of those claiming title to the aforesaid [larger tract] by,
through or under said grantors." The property was abandoned for school
purposes in 1951.
The court, in a most excellent opinion by Lozier, C., held that the
limitation over [executory interest] in favor of the then owners of the
larger tract was void under the rule against perpetuities, and that a possi-
bility of reverter remained in the heirs of the grantor. The court expressly
reserved the question of the alienability of possibilities of reverter.
11. Supra note 1.
12. Supra, note 1.
13. Supra, note 8.
14. 266 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1954).
On the perpetuities problem, see generally 2 GIL, REAL PROPERTY LAW Ix
Missouni 803-822 (1949). Eckhardt & Peterson, Possessory Estates, Future Interests
and Conveyances in. Missouri, 23 V.A.M.S., § 72, p. 63.
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The case involves one problem not mentioned by the court and
apparently not raised by counsel, and that is the effect of the partial
invalidity on the balance of the deed. If the doctrine of Lockridge v.
Mace 15 were applied, the whole deed would be void, and there would be
the very difficult question whether the school acquired the fee simple
absolute by adverse possession.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES-NAVIGABILITY OF STEAMS IN MISSOURI
The well-known case of Elder v. Delcourl0 was considered by Robert
S. Gardner, in a comment in a recent issue of the Missouri Law Review."
In addition to his discussion of Elder v. Delcour, Mr. Gardner treats
exhaustively the several aspects of the problem of navigable waters in
Missouri, with special reference to smaller streams.
TAXATION
ROBERT S. EASTN*
The cases decided in the field of taxation during 1954 by the
Missouri Supreme Court were somewhat less numerous than usual.
Classified by categories, they may be stated as follows:
I. SUBJECTS Aim INcIDENcE OF TAXATxON
A. Federal Estate Taxes
In Carpenter v. Carpenter,' the court was concerned with the
"thrust" of the Federal Estate Tax in a situation where, at the time
of his death, decedent owned a joint and survivors annuity (a part of
his "gross estate" for Federal Estate Tax purposes) which passed
directly to his widow, the value of which was substantially in excess
of the value of his probate estate. The will of decedent directed the
payment of all estate and inheritance taxes "assessed or levied upon any
bequests or devise herein made", out of the residue of the estate. While
it was conceded that a direction to pay estate taxes on a non-probate
15. 109 Mo. 162, 18 S.W. 1145 (1891).
16. 269 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1954), -reversing s. c., 263 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. App. 1953).
17. Gardner, Comment, Water and Watercourses-Navigability of Streams in
Missouri, 19 Mo. LAw REV. 401 (1954).
*Attorney, Kansas City, LL3B., 1931, University of Missouri.
1. 267 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. 1954).
[Vol. 20
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item out of the decedent's estate would be valid, it was held that this
language was not sufficiently broad for the purpose. In such a
situation the court determined that a pro rata part of the tax should be
paid by the widow. In so doing, however, the court refused to lay
down any hard and fast rules as to the "thrust" of the Federal Estate
Tax but held that the matter should be decided on general equitable
principles. Consequently, what the result would be in another fact
situation is left in some doubt.
B. GENERAL REAL ESTATE TAXEs
Section 353.110, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), which gives a




Tax bills issued by a city of the fourth class for street work are
valid, though the work is done by or under contract with the city,
which pays the initial cost out of its general fund and seeks reimburse-
ment through tax bills.3 The tax bills in question were void upon the
initial record, however, since the journal of the Board of Aldermen did
not show the yeas and nays. However, the court could, and properly
did here, permit the amendment of the journal nunc pro tunc to show the
yeas and nays when there was adequate testimony as to the actual
vote.
4
The necessity of a public improvement, to be financed by tax
bills on property in a special benefit district, is solely for the city council
or other legislative body and cannot be attacked in the courts by
arguing that since the formation of the special benefit district was un-
necessary, it was unreasonable, and thus a justifiable question under
the Kansas City Charter. "Unreasonableness" in such a case means
that the boundaries were improper or something of the sort.5
2. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority v. City of St. Louis, 270
S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1954) (en bane). For a fuller discussion of the constitutionality
of the legislation under which Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authorities
operates see State ex inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority,
270 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1954) (en bane).
3. Frago v. City of Irondale, 263 S.W. 356 (Mo. 1954) relying primarily on
the construction of Mo. Rrv. STAT. § 88.687 (1949) (Mo. Rav. STAT. § 7200 (1939),
prior to the 1953 substantial re-enactment.
4. Cf. Fulton v. Lockwood, infra, note 13.
5. In the Matter of Proceedings to Grade North Elmwood Avenue in Kansas
City, 270 S.W.2d 863 (M. 1954).
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11. COLLECTION oF TAXES Am TAX SALES AND TITLES
A. County Collectors
The failure of a county collector to return a delinquent tax list with
his annual settlements with the county court, as required by Section
139.160 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) may amount to a concealment and so toll
the Statute of Limitations in a suit on his bond, at least for a time, but,
since there is no "confidential relationship" between the county court and
the collector, it is necessary for a relator suing on the bond, to plead and
prove the exercise of due diligence by it and the date it discovered the
default or should have discovered it in the exercise of due diligence.0
B. Tax Sales and Titles
In the absence of affirmative proof of mistake or fraud in inducing
confirmation of a sale, the former owner of real estate sold for taxes
under the Land Tax Collection Act applicable to Jackson County (Sec.
141.210-141.810 Missouri Revised Statutes 1949), may not have the sale
set aside after confirmation and after the time for appeal has elapsed upon
the sole ground of inadequacy of consideration. 7 The finding on confirma-
tion amounts to a judgment that the bid price represents the reasonable
value of the property and some affirmative equitable basis for setting
the judgment aside must be shown, other than the court erred in its
conclusion. The supreme court does suggest, by implication, that perhaps
a petition for review will lie, (pursuant to Sections 511.170-511.2408) to
set aside a judgment of tax foreclosure as one rendered by default on
constructive service. There may be some question as to whether this
statute is applicable to the Land Tax Collection Act.
Ill. TANG DIscTs
A. Bonds
Even if the Charter of the City of St. Louis does not permit the
issuance of Revenue Bonds for off-street parking, since such authority is
given by general law (Secs. 82.470 and 82.480, Missouri Revised Statutes,
1949) and since the charter recognizes that such authority may be given
by law (Sec. 1, Article XVII, St. Louis City Charter) such bonds are
6. State ex ret. School District of St. Joseph v. Wells, 270 S.W2d 857
(Mo. 1954).
7. Brasker v. Cirese, 269 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1954) (en bane).
8. Mo. Rzv. STAT. 1949.
[Vol. 20
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valid and, since they are revenue bonds, and not general obligations, a
vote of the people is not required by either Constitution, Statute or
Charter.9
B. Use of Funds and Financing
An initiative proceeding to enact an ordinance creating a firemen's
pension fund does not have to be submitted to a vote of the people where
the proposed ordinance makes certain contributions to the pension fund
mandatory, since this amounts to a proposal for an appropriation ordi-
nance without providing new and additional revenue to meet the appro-
priation as required by Sec. 51, Article E1I of the 1945 Constitution."0
Bride v. City of Siater," which held that a city might not recover
sums paid for oil delivered under an invalid contract, was sharply
limited in two later cases, Grand River Township, DeKalb County v.
Cooke Sales & Service, Inc. 1 2 and Fulton v. City of Lockwood.13 In the
former case an order for a road grader, which called for payments
designated as "rentals" but actually a portion of the purchase price,
payable over two calendar years in the future, violated Sec. 26, Article
VI of the Constitution prohibiting a political subdivision from becoming
indebted in excess of the revenues from current years without a vote
of the people; while in the latter case the infirmity was that the records
of the Board of Aldermen of defendant fourth class city did not show the
passage of an ordinance approving the contract in question and setting
forth the yeas and nays, and no effort was made, as in Frago v. City
of Irondale, supra, to correct the records nunc pro tunc. In both cases
recovery of sums paid on the invalid contracts was permitted and the
rule of the Bride case limited to its particular factual situation.
TORTS
Gim- A. McC..ARY*
The work of the court in this area of the law continued to be quite
heavy. The writer found seventy decisions, excluding the humanitarian
9. Petition of City of St. Louis, 266 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1954).
10. Kansas City v. McGee, 269 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. 1954).
11. 263 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1953).
12. 267 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. 1954).
13. 269 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1954).
*Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of Missouri.
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cases which are treated elsewhere in the Review, appealed on some point
of tort law. However, no new principles of tort law were to be found in
the decisions. Outside of one case of battery and one of libel, all the
torts cases fell in the area of negligence, and most of the negligence cases
involved personal injuries alleged to have been caused by carriers or by
automobile accidents. If it were not for carriers and automobiles, there
would be relatively little litigation for personal injuries.
It seemed to the writer that the court gave closer scrutiny to the
conduct of the plaintiff, or contributory negligence as a matter of law, and
to the matter of excessive damages, in many cases ordering a remittitur
if the plaintiff was to be permitted to hold the verdict and judgment
received in the trial court.
I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Duties to Persons in Certain Relations
1. Possessors of land
An interesting application of the principle that a possessor of land,
abutting upon a public highway, may be subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to trespassing, children by an excavation or other
artificial condition maintained by him thereon so close to the highway
that it involves an unreasonable risk to such children, because of their
tendency to deviate from the highway, was made in Wells v. Henry
W. Kuhs Realty Co.' There the defendant was maintaining a dump
on which it permitted the placing of glass bottles, jars and jugs,
broken and otherwise. The dump was in close proximity to a public
alley passing through the defendant's tract in a thickly populated urban
area. Children in the neighborhood habitually resorted to the public
alley and to other lanes on the defendant's tract of land, and to an
unimproved portion of the defendant's land, for play. Of this the
defendant had knowledge. The margin of demarcation between the
alley and the defendant's property was obscured by dirt and debris,
washed down and pulled down by the defendant from time to time in
previous removals of trash and debris from its dump. The margin was
further obscured by weeds. Here plaintiff's 11 year old son, while
engaged with other children in a game of catching flying June bugs,
inadvertently strayed a few steps, approximately three feet as alleged
L 269 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1961).
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in plaintiff's petition, onto the dump, and was caused to slip and fall
on broken glass, his body coming into direct contact with other broken
glass bottles and jars and resulting in severe cuts of the lower abdomen
from which he died. A judgment of dismissal by the trial court for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted was reversed
by the supreme court.2
The liability of a proprietor of a place of public amusement to a
patron, who was participating in a sport sponsored at such place, was
applied to a rural resort on Big River. The action, in Perkins v. Byrnes, 3
was by the parents for the death of their 19 year old son who drowned
while swimming in the swollen stream which was not marked with
warning notices of high water or swift undercurrent, and there were no
life boats, life belts, or any other form of safety or warning devices. In
reversing the judgment of the lower court, which had directed a
verdict for the defendant at the close of all the evidence, and after
considering other decisions where liability has been imposed upon the
proprietor of a place of public amusement for hazardous conditions in
natural lakes and rivers, the opinion reasoned: "If shallow water,
hidden logs, or a concealed hole, present a jury question of negligence
and consequent liability on the part of the proprietor of a public
bathing resort, a fortiori, a swollen river with a hidden or deceptive
undercurrent is a circumstance upon which reasonable minds could
differ." There was evidence from which a jury could have found that
the dangerous condition was so open and obvious that only the foolhardy
would have attempted to go swimming on this occasion, but those were
not the only inferences to be drawn from the facts and circumstances.
It could not be said as a matter of law that the deceased was contributorily
negligent. Both questions were for the jury.4
Submissible cases were made in Burke v. Stix, Baer & Fuller,5
where an invitee was stepped on in a cafeteria by a waitress who had
stepped backward, without looking, into the aisle where patrons
customarily walked while carrying food, and in Dill v. Dallas County
Farmers' Exchange,6 where the invitee slipped on loose grain on the
floor of the feed store. In both cases an instruction was given that if
2. The case is more fully discussed in 20 Mo. L. Rv. 101 (1955).
3. 269 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1954).
4. The case is more fully considered in 20 Mo. L. REV. 320 (1955).
5. 264 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. 1954).
6. 267 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1954).
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the jury found the injuries were caused by accident and were not due
to any negligence, the invitee was not entitled to recover. The court held
where the issue is whether defendant is or is not negligent, the case
does not justify a so-called "accident" instruction merely because a
jury might find a defendant was innocent of negligence.7
2. Railroads and Other Carriers
While there was an unusually large number of cases involving the
liability of carriers, which were appealed to the Missouri Supreme
Court in the year under review, there was but one case which presented
an interesting problem of liability to merit consideration here. In
Drescher v. Wabash R.R.,8 the action was by the administratrix against
the railroad under the Federal Employees' Liability Act for the death of
a car repairman. The evidence showed that the deceased's automobile
had collided with the railroad's engine and tender on the railroad's
premises, though the deceased-repairman was in the act of leaving the
premises fifty minutes before quitting time without the permission of
the employer. The principal issue was whether the deceased was acting
in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. The plaintiff took the position that the
"scope of employment" under the Act does not require the employee at
the time of his injury to be engaged in performing the actual services
for which he was employed, but only such activity as would be a
necessary incident to his employment; that a trip through the employer's
premises to the place of employment and his return trip through such
premises to get home are necessary incidents to a servant's employment,
and within the reasonable contemplation of the parties. The court held
that it was within the reasonable contemplation of the employment that
the deceased, after quitting his work for the night, would necessarily
traverse the defendant's premises when leaving for home and would use
the road in question, which was provided and maintained by the
defendant in its yards and was the most feasible course of exit; that the
7. Krueger v. Schmiechen, 264 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. 1954), a tort action against the
members of the governing body of a church for injuries alleged to have been
sustained when the plaintiff fell while on the church premises, followed the non-
liability rule of charities in tort actions and this immunity was held to extend to its
members, though the church had obtained a liability insurance policy which covered
members of the governing body. The plaintiff charged negligence in the following
manner: ".... that his said fall was caused by negligence of the defendants, through
their agents and servants, in operating, managing and controlling the said Church."
8. 270 S.W.2d 843 (Mo. 1964).
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relationship of employer and employee obtained throughout the period
of the deceased's presence on the premises that day; that the deceased's
protection under the Federal Employers' Liability Act did not cease
while he was still in the defendant's yards, although he was leaving
fifty minutes before his scheduled quitting time and without permission;
and that the deceased's intended departure, even though fifty minutes
prior to the end of his shift period, was still reasonably incidential to
his employment and reasonably within the contemplation of the parties.9
9. Other cases may be noted involving carries but which do not present new
problems. The action in Hughes v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 265 S.W.2d
273 (Mo. 1954) (en banc), was under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for death
of a switchman, who, after alighting from a train moving in a switching operation,
was struck by defendant's locomotive moving in the opposite direction. Judgment
for the plaintiff was reversed on the ground that instructions which authorized a
finding that defendant's employees, in the exercise of due care, had a duty to look out
and be in a position to see and to communicate and receive signals that the deceased
was in danger, and the failure to do so could be found to be negligence, were pre-
judically erroneous without requiring a finding that, under the circumstances, a
reasonable and prudent man would have anticipated danger to employees so engaged,
so as to impose a duty of look out for their safety. There was no rule introduced, or
custom shown, requiring defendant's employees to look out for the safety of switch-
men working in defendant's yards in any and all circumstances, and the court
could not say as a matter of law that the defendant had such a duty in the circum-
stances of the instant case.
In Envinger v. Thompson, 265 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. 1954) (en. banc), the action
was brought by a mechanic to recover damages for dermatitis allegedly caused by
contact with a compound used by the defendant in the cooling systems of its diesel
engines. Since the harmful characteristics of the chromium compound which was
involved was not a matter of common knowledge, plaintiff's evidence that defendant
should have known it made a jury question.
In an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries to the
plaintiff from a fall down an elevator shaft, wherein it appeared that an operator was
deemed off duty when he had delivered to the incoming operator the key for opening
the doors from the exterior of the shaft, that plaintiff had received the key, but
that the elevator had been moved in plaintiff's absence, it was held in Votrain v.
Illinois R. Co., 268 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. 1954), that the evidence warranted submission to
the jury of the question whether the negligent act of the departing operator in
moving the elevator in whole or in part was the cause of plaintiff's injuries, or
whether plaintiff was guilty of negligence which was the sole cause of his fall and
injuries.
McDill v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 268 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1954), was an
action by a railroad employee for injuries sustained when a sheet iron side riser of a
diesel step assembly, which he was flattening, skidded off the rounded top of an anvil,
when the employee tripped while changing his handholds on the sheet metal, and
fell upon employee's right great toe. Whether -the employer was negligent in failing
to furnish an anvil with a square top and in not properly maintaining the floor before
the employee's work bench were properly left to the jury.
An instruction, in an interurban car-automobile crossing collision case, "that
the defendant railroad company did not have an absolute and unqualified right of
way at the crossing. . . but owed the duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid a prob-
able accident thereat, which duty commenced as soon as defendant's motorman knew,
or had reason to apprehend that a vehicle approaching the crossing apparently would
not stay out of danger and the court further instructs you that the defendant railroad
company was not relieved from such duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid a
47
Eickhoff: Eickhoff: Work of the Supreme Court 1954
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1955
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
3. Automobiles
In volume, the appeals arising from injuries received in automobile
accidents were approximately equal in number to the cases involving
carriers. As in the carrier case, no new questions of liability were
presented, the grounds of the appeals presenting only the usual problems
whether a submissible case had been made, the adequacy of instructions,
and other general grounds. The more important questions in the
automobile cases involved the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and contribu-
tory negligence and are considered under those headings.' 0
probable accident by having erected a properly functioning automatic warning signal
at said crossing," was held, in Jones v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 272 S.W.2d 272 (Mo.
1954) (en bane), misleading and calculated to minimize the effect of defendant's
evidence, causing the jury to believe it should not consider, in determining whether
plaintiff was contributorily negligent, that the railroad automatic warning signal was
properly functioning.
Reese v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 273 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. 1954), was an action under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act by a switchman against the railroad company
for injuries sustained by him while operating a switch in the railroad yard. The
giving of instructions which directed a verdict for the switchman was held to con-
stitute error, in view of the fact that the instruction did not submit that the ice
condition involved was dangerous or not reasonably safe as charged in the petition.
In the exercise of the highest degree of care by a bus carrier of passengers,
sufficient time must be allowed before starting up so that the alighting passenger shall
have a reasonable opportunity to reach a place of safety and will not be imperiled
by the carrier's movement of the bus. Before starting the bus the operator should
see and know that the alighting passenger has not only alighted safely, but that he Is
not in such position or situation as to be imperiled by the starting up of the bus; and
that if the position of the alighting passenger upon the street be such that the move-
ment of the bus might imperil or endanger him, the carrier is charged by law with
knowledge of such fact. This rule was applied in Mayor v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.,
269 S.W.2d 101 (Mo. 1954), in an action by a bus passenger, who walked with the aid
of crutches, for injuries sustained when the bus, from which the passenger had
alighted on a rainy night from the front end of the bus within plain view of the
operator, struck the passenger's crutch as the bus was making a right turn, and caused
the passenger to fall beneath the bus.
In Brock v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 270 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. 1954), the defendant's
duty to exercise ordinary care to provide a brakeman with a reasonably safe place in
which to work was applied to work being performed on a spur track into the premises
of a third person. Here the injuries were sustained when the plaintiff-brakeman
stepped into a hole containing boiling water as he left the engine to uncouple cars.
The defendant was held under a duty to inspect the spur track at reasonable intervals
and to use ordinary care in such inspections to keep the premises in a reasonable safe
condition for plaintiff's use.
10. Other cases may be noted involving automobiles but which do not present
new questions. Stroh v. Johns, 264 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1954), an action for wrongful
death, the granting of a new trial by the trial court was upheld, after a verdict for the
plaintiff, on the ground that plaintiff's counsel argued to the jury that the immediate
and direct cause of the collision was the great speed of defendant's automobile, when
failure to slacken speed and not excessive speed was submitted by the instructions,
notwithstanding plaintiff's contention that such argument was merely another way of
saying that failure to slacken speed was the direct cause of the collision. The plaintiff
had the right to argue speed as a circumstance shown on the issues of defendant to
slacken the speed, but not to argue speed as an independent ground of negligence
when excessive or great speed was not submitted as a ground of negligence.
[Vol. 20
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4. Imputed Negligence
Whether a tree trimmer employed by a telephone company to clear
the company's right of way of trees and brush, so that the company could
install new telephone lines, the three trimmer furnishing all labor, tools,
equipment, vehicles and supervision required, was an agent or an
independent contractor was presented in Williamson v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co." The plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger
in an automobile which was struck by a truck of the tree trimmer which
was traveling in the opposite direction, causing a pruning hook on a
rack on the left side of the truck to crash through the windshield and
strike her head. The court held as a matter of law that the tree trimmer
had the status of an independent contractor so that the telephone
company was not liable on an employer-employee theory. It was further
held that the company was not liable on the ground that the tree
trimmer was carrying out the company's franchise function or duty of
operating a telephone company or furnishing telephone service, within the
meaning of the rule that one carrying on an activity which can be
lawfully carried only under franchise granted by public authority
cannot delegate the work to be done. The court said that "In a sense,
every act of a corporation is done under its charter.., but it does not
follow merely because the corporation is a public utility that its acts
or contracts fall within the category of the nondelegable duties granted
by the franchise." The court pointed out that the danger from the
'operation of the truck arose from the manner in which the work was
performed, and was not a danger inherent in the work of clearing the
right of way or the transportation of tools and employees so as to be
nondelegable to an independent contractor.12
Where plaintiffs automobile, which had been traveling down the highway, struck
the defendant's automobile which had entered the intersection first from a side road
which bore a stop sign, it was held in Ferguson v. Betterton, 270 S.W. 2d 756 (1954),
that the defendant's instruction that if she entered the intersection from the plaintiff's
right before or approximately at the same time that the plaintiff entered the inter-
section then the defendant had the right of way, and that even though this did not
relieve the defendant of her duty to exercise the highest degree of care, it did entitle
her to assume that the plaintiff motorist would respect her right until such time as she
observed to the contrary, was not prejudicially erroneous.
11. 265 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. 1954).
12. A novel theory of liability was presented in Slicer v. W. J. Menefee Const.
Co., 270 S.W.2d 778 (Mo. 1954), in an action by the husband for wrongful death of his
wife who was killed while crossing a new highway which was being constructed by
the defendant contractor. On appeal from the dismissal of the action on the ground
that the petition did not state a cause of action, it was held that no duty was owed by
the contractor to the plaintiff's wife. The fact that the contractors permitted public
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5. Humanitarian Negligence
The cases based on the humanitarian doctrine are treated separately
in each volume of the Review by Mr. Becker.13 Due to the significance
of the doctrine to Missouri lawyers, it has been thought that these
decisions should receive special emphasis.
B. Res ipsa loquitur
The automobile accident cases do not afford a fertile field for the
application of the doctrine res ipsa loquitur. Where two automobiles are
operated by different possessors, it cannot be said that the defendant was
in sole control and management of the agencies involved, a basic require-
ment before negligence may be inferred on the part of one of the opera-
tors without proving the sepcific fact of negligence. Where only one auto-
mobile is involved in the accident, the doctrine is not applied in many
situations, principally because so many accidents can happen while
operating an automobile without any negligence on the part of the
operator, that it cannot be said that accidents of this nature do not
usually happen unless there has been negligence, which is another and
equally basic element for the application of the doctrine. While the
doctrine is not usually applicable to injuries received when an automobile
in which the plaintiff is riding runs off of the highway, if the plaintiff
can show some additional fact which helps to show negligence in
operating the automobile prior to running off of the highway the doctrine
will be applicable. In Browne v. Heeter,14 in an action for injuries
to the plaintiff when the automobile in which he was riding, and which
was driven by the defendant, left the roadway and struck a tree, it
appeared that the defendant swerved to the right in attempting to avoid a
collision with another car which he suddenly observed approaching
him partially (3 to 4 feet) in the defendant's lane. The defendant did
have control of the car and did cause it to swerve off of the highway
into a tree. The court held that the accident did point to some negligence
in the defendant in the manner in which he swerved under the circum-
stances (there were 6 to 7 feet of pavement and 5 to 6 feet of shoulder
within which to swerve to avoid the collision). Nor was specific
travel upon the unfinished and unfit-for-public-travel highway would not create a
duty owed by the defendant-contractor to deceased, assuring the deceased safe ingress
and egress between her residence and the old highway.
13. Becker, The Missouri Supreme Court and the Humanitarian Doctrine in the
Year 1954, 20 Mo. L. REv. 38 (1955).
14. 267 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1954).
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negligence shown by the plaintiff, as the cause of the swerving was
given by the defendant in his deposition. Plaintiff was not bound by
the defendant's deposition version of what caused the collision, in the
sense of what caused the defendant to run into the tree, and did not
show or prove defendant's precise negligence.
Much the same type of problem is involved where the injuries result
to the plaintiff while riding in an automobile which skids off of the
highway. It is a long settled rule in Missouri that the mere skidding of
an automobile is, in and of itself, not such an occurrence that will
permit an inference of negligence, because skidding as a matter of
experience may occur without fault. Therefore, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur has been held inapplicable unless there is evidence of some
fact or circumstance connected with the skidding from which negligence
may be inferred. In Triplett v. Beeler,1 5 an action for injuries sustained
by the plaintiff, a passenger, when the automobile in which he was
riding skidded off of the pavement during a rainstorm at night, evidence
as to the speed of the automobile and the inattention of the driver at the
time or just prior to the skidding was held sufficient to submit the case
to the jury under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.1 6
C. Defenses in Negligence Cases
A case of particular interest to plaintiffs, whose cause of action
arises in a jurisdiction where as a part of his case he must plead and
prove that he was in the exercise of due care, is Redick v. Thomas Auto
Sales, Inc.1 7 There it was held that, under Illinois law, the plaintiff
was obliged to plead and prove his own due care, or lack of contributory
negligence nothwithstanding the Missouri rule making contributory
negligence an affirmative defense. It was held that the Illinois require-
ment that plaintiff plead and prove that he was in the exercise of due
care was substantive and not merely procedural, as both are essential
elements of the plaintiff's right to recover under the law of Illinois.
Missouri cases following the previous rule were expressly disapproved.
The trial court was held not to have erred in refusing to instruct the
jury that the burden of proving defendant's contributory negligence
rested upon the defendant.
15. 268 S.W2d 814 (Mo. 1954).
16. See a more complete discussion of the problem in 20 Mo. L. REV. 216 (1955).
17. 273 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. 1954).
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The problem of what a driver of an automobile may be expected
to do, to avoid being held contributorily negligent as a matter of law,
when he is faced with the situation of an approaching automobile
encroaching upon his side of the highway, was quite fully considered
in Moore v. Middiewest Freightways, Inc.18 There it was held that the
plaintiff truck driver, who saw defendant's approaching truck en-
croaching upon his side of the highway 900 to 1000 feet from him, had
the right to assume that it would turn back in time to avoid a collision
and to continue to assume, until he knew, or by the exercise of the
highest degree of care should have known, that it would not do so; and
even after he became chargeable with knowledge that the defendant's
approaching truck would not turn back to its own side of the road in
time to avoid the collision, he was obliged to turn onto the shoulder
only if it appeared, in the existing darkness, reasonably practicable and'
not dangerous, even though daylight inspection might disclose that the
maneuver could have been made in safety.
The rule in Missouri that one is not necessarily contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law solely because he drives at a speed which prevents
his stopping within the distance his headlights reveal objects ahead of
him, and that whether he is contributorily negligent as a matter of law
depends upon all the circumstances in a particular case, was again applied
in Parsons v. Noel.' 9 This was an action for the wrongful death of the
plaintiff's husband resulting from a collision between an automobile
driven by the decedent and a truck which had stopped by the defendant's
employee with its rear dual wheels on the highway.
An interesting situation involving contributory negligence is found
in Stoessel v. St. Louis Public Service Co. 20 The action was for injuries
allegedly sustained when the defendant's streetcar, which the plaintiff
was about to board, moved forward and around a curve in such a
manner that the plaintiff, who was standing where she was invited to
stand to board the streetcar, was struck by the rear overhand of the
car. From a judgment for the defendant, the trial court granted a new
trial, which order was affirmed by the supreme court, on the ground
that an instruction was patently erroneous, in directing a verdict for
the defendant, upon finding the plaintiff negligent if the jury found that
18. 266 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. 1954).
19. 271 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. 1954).
20. 269 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1954).
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the plaintiff saw or could have seen the yellow warning line and
stood between such yellow line and the side of the car which she had
to do to board the car, when she knew or could have known that the
rear end of the streetcar would swing out and strike her. The court
held that the issue on contributory negligence was not whether the
plaintiff stood between the yellow line and the streetcar with knowledge
that the car would strike her if it started forward, since she stood where
she was invited to stand and where she had to stand in order to board
the streetcar. That place was necessarily between the yellow warning
line and the side of the streetcar. Thus the plaintiff's knowledge when
standing in this designated place that the rear end of the streetcar
would strike her, if the car started before she boarded it, would not
prove negligence on her part. The issue was whether the plaintiff
continued to stand in that place after the car started forward with
knowledge that it would strike her if she did not step back behind the
yellow line, and with time to have so acted before the rear end of the car
struck her. The instruction did not hypothesize these facts which
would point to any duty on the plaintiff to act until after the car started
forward. The court said that "the instruction obviously fails to hypothe-
size that plaintiff continued to stand between the yellow line and the
streetcar after the car started forward with knowledge that she was then
in the path of the overhand and with knowledge that the car was proceed-
ing immediately onto a left curve and that she had time to remove herself
from such position before being struck."
The care which a guest in an automobile must use, to avoid being
contributorily negligent, was raised in the instructions in Toburen v.
Carter,21 where the guest was injured when the automobile in which
she was riding collided at night with the rear of the defendant's auto-
mobile. In the absence of visible lack of caution of the driver or known
imminence of danger, a guest may ordinarily rely upon the driver who
has the exclusive control of the automobile. Only when dangers, which
are either reasonably manifest or known to the guest, confront the
driver, and the guest has an adequate and proper opportunity to conduct
or influence the situation for safety is he negligent if he sits by without
warning or protest and permits himself to be driven carelessly to his
injury. Thus an instruction, given for the defendant, which permitted
the jury to find that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent if the
21. 273 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1954).
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plaintiff could have seen the defendant's automobile and could have
warned the driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding
of the danger so as to avoid the collision, was prejudicially erroneous in
that it placed upon the plaintiff the absolute duty to warn the driver if
she could have seen the defendant's automobile in time to enable the
driver to avoid the collision. The court pointed out that this portion
of the instruction would impose a higher duty on the guest than that
of the operator, which is to exercise the highest degree of care.22
D. Burden of Proof
An instruction which requires the plaintiff or the defendant to
prove an issue "to the satisfaction of the jury" has been held to be
erroneous. However the court observed, in Lebow v. Missouri Public
Service Co.,23 that no case has been reversed and remanded because
the instruction contained this phrase. In that case the court instructed
the jury that the defendant pleading contributory negligence has the
burden of proof, "and it devolves upon the defendant to prove such
contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence to the
satisfaction of the jury, before you are warranted in finding for defendant
on that issue, unless the evidence offered by the plaintiff shows he was
22. A driver of a motor vehicle is contributorily negligent as a matter of law
where, having a clear view along the railroad track drives upon the track in the
daytime, when by looking he could have seen the approaching train. This has long
been the rule in Missouri. Lohmann v. Wabash R.R., 269 S.W.2d 885 (1954). Likewise,
where a driver of a motor vehicle drives onto a railroad track despite the warning of
a red flashing light, he is contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In Threlkeld v.
Wabash R. R. Co., 269 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. 1954), the driver assumed that the flashing
lights were only operating because a train was standing at the station, and that any
approaching train would not exceed the speed limit and would give the statutory
warning which he could hear.
In White v. Rohrer, 267 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1954), it was pointed out, in an action
for injuries received by the plaintiff when the defendant ran into the rear-end of his
car, that the test of the sufficiency of a warning of an automobile to stop is whether it
is timely, the form and character of the signal, whether by arm or by lights, depending
on the circumstances, and the forward driver does not in all circumstances discharge
the full measure of duty to give adequate or timely warning when he employs his
brake signals only.
In Crandall v. McGilvray, 270 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. 1954), in an action against the
employer for injuries sustained by a farmhand when the fingers of his left hand
were caught in the husking rollers of a mechanical corn picker, judgment was entered
by the trial court for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the
plaintiff. This was affirmed as the farm hand was held to have been contributorily
negligent as a matter of law where he attempted to remove an obstruction which had
stopped the husking rollers of the mechanical corn picker without first disengaging
the power take-off, when he knew that the rollers would resume operation at high
speed and might draw his hand between the rollers if the power take-off was not
disengaged.
23. 270 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. 1954).
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guilty of contributory negligence, and in this connection you are further
instructed that the law presumes that the said .. .was in the exercise
of ordinary care in the absence of evidence to the contrary." The latter
part of the instruction on the presumption of ordinary care, where there
is evidence of the plaintiff's contributory negligence, was held to be
erroneous, and when the effect of these two erroneous directions are
combined, the instruction was held to be reversibly erroneous.
In Young v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 24 an instruction upon
the burden of proof and in defining terms informed the jury "that by the
term 'greater weight or preponderance of the credible evidence' is
meant that evidence which is most convincing to the minds of the jury."
From a verdict in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appealed on
the ground that the instruction erroneously required the highest degree
of proof by the plaintiff. The court held that this did not overemphasize
the burden of proof to mislead the jury.25
THE NEW GENERAL CODE FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE AND




Persons who would be parties to a suit must have some actual and
justiciable interest susceptible of protection by that suit.1
24. 270 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1954).
25. An instruction given in Hall v. Brookshire, 267 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1954)
(en banc), in an action for libel, that plaintiff was required to prove his case by the
preponderance of the evidence, but that the burden of proof rested upon the
defendant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that plaintiff had committed perjury
in order to sustain his defense of truth, was erroneous. A plea of justification in libel
and slander actions involving the imputation of crime may be sustained by a
preponderance of the evidence, the same as the rights of the parties in other civil
actions, and the defense does not have to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri, A.B., 1911, Leland Stanford University,
LL.B., 1915, Harvard University. Draftsman for the Missouri Supreme Court Com-
mittee on Civil Practice and Procedure.
1. Hribernik v. Reorganized School District R-3, 276 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. App. 1955).
It is usually said that one must be a real party in interest. Dillard v. Dillard,
266 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. 1954). In this case it was held that, in view of the fact that upon
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In a taxpayers' action to enjoin collection of school tax allegedly
approved at a void election where one plaintiff had never owed or paid
a school tax, and the other two plaintiffs paid their school tax during
the pendency of the action, they had no justiciable interest in the action
and could not be parties.2
b. Necessary
In an action on a contract by one of the parties thereto, the only
parties defendant who may be necessary are the other parties to the con-
tract sued on, and those who have an interest in the dispute which will be
affected by the action.
In an action by the purchaser against the vendors for specific
performance of a contract for the sale of a farm, cattle, and implements,
the vendors' farm manager, who was not a party to the contract, was
not a necessary party because he was to receive, as part of his
compensation, $10 for each calf sold, and the purchaser in the contract
had agreed to sue for payment of such amount.3
Judgment for contestants in will contest proceedings was not void
because the testator's widow, a beneficiary in the will, was not a party
to the action where the widow appeared as a witness and testified that
she had renounced the will and had exercised her statutory right of
election and was asserting no claim or interest under the will. 4
c. Interpleader
The mere fact that about 88 per cent of the outstanding preferred
and common stock of a railroad corporation was owned by a second
railroad corporation did not show that the first railroad corporation was
not a fair and impartial stakeholder entitled to maintain an interpleader
suit to determine the right of the preferred stockholders to an additional
dividend.5
the death of a testator the real estate passes directly to the devisees named in his will,
the executrix of a decedent was not, in the absence of a showing of interest of the
executrix as such in the realty possessed by the defendent, the real party in interest
with respect to a suit for a declaratory judgment as to the ownership of the real
estate, and a declaratory judgment suit for such a purpose could not be instituted
and maintained by the executrix.
Also, see Fort Osage Drainage District v. Jackson County, 275 S.W.2d 326
(Mo. 1955), as to the real party interest in an action by a drainage district against
a county to collect a maintenance tax levied against the benefits to public roads
and highways in the district.
2. Hribernik v. Reorganized School District R-3, supra note 1.
3. Ray v. Wooster, 270 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. 1954).
4. Donnan v. Donnan, 264 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. 1954).
5. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Meyer, 272 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1954).
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Further, the fact that a railroad corporation induced the court to
quash certain subpoenas duces tecum or refused to produce documents,
particularly correspondence and opinions of lawyers as to the right of
the preferred stock to participate in additional dividends, did not show
a lack of impartiality on the part of the railroad corporation so as to
deprive it of the status of stakeholder to maintain an interpleader suit
to determine the right of the preferred stockholders to participate in
additional dividends.6
Again, the fact that, 11 days prior to the institution of an interpleader
suit by the first railroad corporation to determine the right of the
preferred stockholders to participate in additional dividends deposited
in a special dividend fund with a trust company, the counsel of the
second railroad corporation, which owned about 88 per cent of the total
stock of the first railroad corporation, wrote a letter to the first corpora-
tion's counsel and took the position that the preferred stock was entitled
to participating rights, did not compel the inference that there was
collusion on the part of the first railroad corporation in instituting the
suit and did not defeat, as a matter of law, the first railroad corporation's
right to maintain the suit.7
Interpleader may not be defeated initially by the mere assertion that
a fund is larger in amount than the amount tendered.8
Hence, an alleged fact that a railroad corporation failed to pay into
court the entire amount due stockholders as additional dividends did not
defeat an interpleader suit by the railroad corporation to determine
the right of the preferred stockholders to participate in additional
dividends, in the absence of any showing of an abuse of discretion on
the part of the board of directors.9
d. Class Actions
Class suits can be maintained only by those whose interests are real
and susceptible of some relief.1 0
Therefore, in a taxpayer's action to enjoin the collections of a school





10. Supra note 1.
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justiciable interest in the controversy, they could not represent other
taxpayers who had not paid the school tax."
The requirements of Missouri Supreme Court Rule 3.07 relating to
class actions cannot be regarded as merely technical or directory. It is
mandatory, and it reveals the court's solicitude for the constitutionality of
Section 507.070 of the present Missouri Revised Statutes by requiring
that the elements of due process be accorded to all absent persons whom
others who sue would bind as a class. That section forbids suitors to
bind members of a class unless it is made apparent by the procedure
followed that they fairly and adequately represent that class. 12
e. Intervention
Interventions in pending causes are of two classes, first, those in
which the intervention is not indispensible to the asserted right or interest
of the petitioner for intervention, and second, those in which the absolute
right is given by statute, or where the intervener's asserted interest can be
preserved or enforced only by permitting intervention in a pending cause.
It must therefore appear that the petitioning intervener must have
(1) an "interest" in the pending action, and (2) that the representation
of such interest "by existing parties is or may be inadequate," and (3)
that the intervener "is or may be bound by a judgment in the action".
The word "interest," as used in the intervention statute has a definite
legal meaning. It generally means a concern which is more than mere
curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire. One interested in an action
is one who is interested in the outcome or result thereof because he has
a legal right which will be directly enlarged or diminished by the judg-
ment or decree in such action. It means a direct and immediate claim to,
and having its origin in, the demand made or proceeds sought or prayed
by one of the parties to the original action, but such "interest" does not
include a mere consequential, remote, or conjectural possibility of being
in some manner affected by the result of the original action; to come
within the above statute, the "interest" must be such an immediate and
direct claim upon the very subject matter of the action that the intervener
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. For an example of a proper class action, see St. Louis Southwestern
Railway Co. v. Meyer, supra note 5.
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will either gain or lose by the direct operation of the judgment that may
be rendered therein.' 3
SERVICE
a. By Publication
Where a railroad corporation, in addition to declaring a dividend of
$5 a share on both preferred and common stock, declared a further divi-
dend of $1 a share on outstanding shares of capital stock, but payment
of the further dividend was withheld because of the reasonable doubt
as to the right of the preferred stockholders to participate, and the cor-
poration deposited an additional dividend in the special dividend fund in
a trust company for the benefit of the shareholders, before the institution
of an interpleader suit, service by publication on non-resident defendants
was authorized under the statute providing that service by publication
shall be allowed in all cases affecting a "fund", "specific property", or
any "res" or status within the jurisdiction of the court."4
PLEADING
a. Office of
The office of pleadings is to define and to isolate the issues to those
controverted so as to advise the trial court and the parties of the issues
to be tried and to expediate the trial of the cause on its merits.' 5
b. Construction of
All pleadings shall be so constructed as to do substantial justice, and,
even as formerly, the parties are to be protected by the court when it
construes pleadings in order to secure them against being misled. Under
the present civil code pleadings are not to be used to conceal issues and
to ambush the adverse party.'6
Where there is no attack upon a petition prior to judgment, every
reasonable intendment will be indulged in favor of the pleading, and the
petition will be construed most favorably to the plaintiff.17
13. State of Missouri ex Tel. Farmers Mutuals Automobile Ins. Co. v. Weber,
273 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. 1954).
14. St. Louis Southewestern Railway Co. v. Meyer, supra note 5.
15. Dillard v. Thomas, 270 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. App. 1954).
16. Hildebrand v. Anderson, 270 S.W.2d 406 (Mo. App. 1954).
17. Emerson v. Treadway, 270 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App. 1954).
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c. Necessity of Reply
In an action against a power company for the damages caused by the
erection of a transmission line across the plaintiff's land, the statement
in the power company's general denial that a construction company
erected the power line and committed the acts complained of was not an
averment that the construction company was an independent contractor
and the plaintiffs were not required to file a reply to that averment. 8
d. Petition
1. Form of Action
The form of an action is determined by the substance of the petition.19
2. And/or
In an action against a landlord and a tenant in control of premises
for injuries sustained when the railing on which an invitee was leaning
collapsed, a petition which stated that the defendants, as owners, and/or
agents, had control, management, supervision, and possession of the
premises was not defective for use of phrase "and/or" as failing to state a
theory of liability.20
3. Different Theories
If a petition contains averments which, if proved, would entitle the
plaintiff to recover on either of several theories, and it is impossible to say
definitely whether the plaintiff is counting on one or the other, he may
be permitted to recover upon whichever of the two theories his evidence
may warrant, and the allegations not necessary to the statement of the
cause of action on which recovery properly may be had may be treated
as surplusage and disregarded.2 1
4. The Prayer
Although our courts have on several occasions loosely stated that
the prayer is no part of the petition-a thought more accurately ex-
pressed by saying that the relief prayed for is not part of the plaintiff's
cause of action in determining the cause of action intended to be pleaded
under the new code-if the allegations of fact are ambiguous or suscepti-
18. Linder et ux. v. White River Valley Electric Co-op, 270 S.W2d 414 (Mo. App.
1954).
19. Hildebrand v. Anderson, supra note 16; Duvall v. Stokes, 270 S.W.2d 419
(Mo. App. 1954).
20. Coplen v. Zimmerman, 271 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1954).
21. Emerson v. Treadway, supra note 17.
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ble of two constructions, the prayer may be looked to for the purpose of




A property owners' allegation that an alleged employee was an
independent contractor, who had agreed to furnish all materials and to
construct a house for an agreed sum, constituted a general denial to the
lumber company's petition, which alleged that the property owners had
purchased lumber and materials furnished to their alleged employee, and
raised the sole question as to whether the property owners or their
authorized agent purchased the lumber and materials.
2 3
2. Affirmative Defenses
Failure of consideration 24 and laches2 5 are affirmative defenses.
It has been held recently, in an action in Missouri relating to an
automobile collision in Illinois, that the law of that state to the affect that
the rule that the plaintiff must plead and prove his due care is substantive
law shall prevail in the action here, and that a petition which fails to allege
the plaintiff's care is insufficient. 2 a This appears to reverse earlier
decisions.
3. Alternative and Hypothetical Defenses
One may plead in the alternative 26 and hypothetically.2 7
4. Joinder of Defenses
A denial in a slander action that the words charged were spoken
and a defense that the words spoken are true may be joined in the same
answer, as they are not inconsistent. It does not necessarily follow that
the defendants spoke the alleged slanderous words because of the claim
that they are true.28
One may assert any number of defenses alternately or hypothetically,
though they are inconsistent. 29
22. Hildebrand v. Anderson, supra note 16; Duvall v. Stokes, supra note 19.
23. R. 3. Hurley Lumber Co. v. Cummings, 264 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. App. 1954).
24. Dugan v. Trout, 271 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. App. 1954).
25. State of Missouri, inf. Dalton v. Mattingly, 275 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. App. 1955).
25a. Redick v. M. B. Thomas Auto Sales, 273 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. 1954).
26. Five Twelve Locust v. Mednikow, 270 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1954).
27. Trice v. Lancaster, 270 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. App. 1954); Five Twelve Locust v.
Mednikow, supra note 26.
28. Trice v. Lancaster, supra note 27.
29. Five Twelve Locust v. Mednikow, supra note 26.
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Affirmative judgments may be granted in connection with counter-
claims.3 0
2. Refiling of reply
Where a defendant's refiled counterclaim did not differ in legal effect
from the defendant's initial counterclaim, the plaintiff was not required
to refile his reply to the defendant's counterclaim or his own counterclaim
which was filed at the same time as the reply.3 '
g. Amendments to Pleadings
1. Scope of
It is unnecessary to consider whether interlined amendments con-
stitute entirely new matter and a departure from the previous pleading,
for the old rule against departure in pleadings has been abrogated by
our new civil code and is no longer recognized or enforced. Amendments
are now unlimited in scope and, in the absence of prejudice to other
parties or harmful consequences of delay, courts should be extremely
liberal in permitting them. Whether an amendment of a pleading should
be permitted is primarily within the sound judicial discretion of the trial
judge, whose action will not be disturbed where there is no showing
that such discretion has been palpably and obviously abused.8 2
2. Relation Back
Although it is true that a prior pleading is abandoned by the filing
of an amended one, the amended pleading relates back to the time of the
filing of the original pleading, if the claim or defense stated in the
amended pleading is the same as that stated in the original one. Where
a refied counterclaim differed from the counterclaim, as initially stated
and filed, only superficially in form and language and not at all in sub-
stance and legal effect. the refied counterclaim related back to the date
on which the counterclaim was filed originally.83
30. Hildebrand v. Anderson, supra note 16.
31. Ibid.
32. Stewart v. Stewart, 277 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. App. 1955). Also, see Slater v.
Kansas City Terminal Railway Company, 271 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. 1954), in which the
amendment merely provided that the plaintiff was suing as a widow rather than as
an administratrix.
33. Hildebrand v. Anderson, supra note 16.
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3. Partition Actions
Since all pleadings and proceedings in a partition suit are governed
by the rules applicable in ordinary civil actions, the pleadings in a
partition suit may be amended as provided by Section 509.490 of our
Revised Statutes.3 4
4. Trial of Issues Not Raised by Pleadings
In a servant's action for injuries, where the evidence as to the loss
of future earnings came in without objection, the petition would be con-
sidered as amended in accordance therewith.35
Also, where prospective purchasers testified, in an action to recover
an earnest money deposit, that the broker had agreed to arrange certain
financing as a condition to purchase, and the broker did not object to
such testimony but joined issue thereon and testified that he had not pro-
mised to do so, the issue of whether the broker had promised to arrange
the financing would be treated as if it had been raised in the pleadings. 36
MOTION TO DIsmss
a. Admissions and Inferences
In ruling on a motion to dismiss a petition, all properly pleaded facts
in and all inferences of fact that may fairly and reasonably be drawn
from the petition must be taken as true.37
However, neither conclusions of law nor conclusions of the pleader
on the facts are admitted by a motion to dismiss and, where such con-
clusions appear in a petition, they must be disregarded. 38
b. Matters Considered
On a motion to dismiss a petition for failure to state any cause of
action against the defendants, the court may only consider what appears
on the face of the petition.3 9 Hence, evidence tending to show laches could
not be considered. 40
34. Stewart v. Stewart, supra note 32.
35. Evinger v. Thompson, 265 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. 1954).
36. Kimbrough v. Gross, 268 S.W.2d 56 (Mo. App. 1954).
37. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 272 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. 1954); Gilbert v. Edwards, 276 S.W.2d
6U (Mo. App. 1955).
38. Gilbert v. Edwards, supra note 37.
39. State of Missouri, inf. Dalton v. Mattingly, supra note 25; Hudson v. Jones,
278 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. App. 1955).
40. State of Missouri, inf. Dalton v. Mattingly, supra note 25.
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c. Construction of
In determining whether or not a petition states a claim or cause of
action, the averments of the petition are to be given a liberal construction,
according the averments their reasonable and fair intendment. So con-
sidered, a petition should be held sufficient if its averments invoke
substantive principles of law which entitle the plaintiff to relief.41
JOINDER OF GRouNDs FOR MOTION
All of the presently existent motion grounds intended to be relied
on must be included in one motion, the movant cannot separate them,
and file a separate motion for each cause assigned.42
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON TM PLEADINGS
a. Admissions
A motion for a judgment on the pleadings admits well-pleaded facts
but not mere conclusions.43
b. When Sustained
A motion for a judgment on the pleadings will be sustained only
if the moving party is entitled to the judgment as a matter of law.4 4
MOTION FOR DIsMIssAL
a. Weighing Evidence
On a motion to dismiss in an equity case, the trial court may weigh
the evidence.45
b. Waiver of
A motion to dismiss was waived by the defendant by having intro-
duced testimony on the merits of the case after the refusing of the
motion.46
c. Lack of Prosecution
A judgment dismissing an action for want of prosecution, on the trial
41. Wells v. Henry W. Kuhs Realty Co., 269 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1954).
42. State of Missouri ex Tel. and to the Use of Hicklin v. Fidelity and Casualty
Company of New York, 274 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. App. 1955).
43. Brickell v. Kansas City, Mo, 265 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. 1954); State ex rel. Day
v. Meriwether, Judge, 269 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. App. 1954).
44. Bricknell v. Kansas City, Mo., supra note 43.
45. Creek v. Union Nat. Bank in Kansas City, 266 S.W. 737 (Mo. 1954).
46. Ex pcarte Ferone, 267 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. App. 1954).
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court's own motion, and by virtue of the trial court's inherent power, was
not void because the dismissal was without notice to the plaintiff. 47
The action of a trial court in dismissing the plaintiff's cause of action
for want of prosecution is not a judgment on the merits, and does not
constitute a dismissal with prejudice which prevents the plaintiff from
refiling his cause of action.48
MOTION FOR DnEcTEm VERDICT AND AFTER-TRIAL
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
a. When granted
A motion for a directed verdict or for an after-trial motion for
judgment should be sustained only where the evidence and inferences
reasonably drawn therefrom are so strongly against a party that there
is not room for reasonable minds to differ.49
It is usually held that a party asserting the affirmative of a deter-
minative issue, proof of which is necessary to establish the fact, is not
entitled to a directed verdict where his proof rests on oral testimony,
although the opposing party offers no evidence on the issue, as the truth
and weight of his evidence, the credibility of his witnesses, remains an
issue for the jury.
This general rule is not applicable in unusual situations where the
defendant in his pleadings or by his counsel in open court admits the
plaintiff's claim, or by his evidence also establishes the plaintiff's claim,
or where there is no real dispute of the basic facts supported by uncon-
tradicted testimony essential to a claim or to an affirmative defense.50
b. Waiver of
An alleged error in overruling a defendant's motion for a directed
verdict at the close of a plaintiff's case is waived when the defendant
subsequently introduces evidence on the merits.51
47. Snyder v. Christie, 272 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. App. 1954).
48. Ibid.
49. Hamnnontree v. Edison Bros. Stores, 270 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. App. 1954); Morris
v. Alexander, 275 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. App. 1955); Bartling v. Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company, 275 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. App. 1955); Also, see Helton v. Huckeba, 270 S.W.2d
486 (Mo. App. 1954).
50. Rogers v. Thompson, 265 S.W.2d 282 (Mo. 1954).
51. Wilt v. Waterfield, 273 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. 1954); Baird v. Ellsworth Realty
Co., 265 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. App. 1954); Lerner v. Yeghishian, 271 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. App.
1954); Wilson v. White, 272 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App. 1954); Farmer v. London & Lanca-
shire Insurance Company, 274 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. App. 1955).
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CASES TRiE WTHOUT A JuRY
a. Excluded Evidence
Where the appellants claimed that the trial court erroneously ex-
cluded certain evidence in an interpleader suit, but such evidence was
preserved, the evidence, so far as it was admissible, and met the require-
ments of relevancy, materiality, and probative force, would be considered
by the supreme court on appeal. 52
b. Findings of Facts
In cases tried without a jury, all issues of fact upon which no specific
findings are made are deemed on appeal to have been found in accordance
with the result reached.53
c. Request for Findings and Conclusions
Where the plaintiff filed a written request for findings of fact and
conclusions of law but did not do so until nine days after the court
had rendered a final judgment, the court was not required to grant his
request.54
d. Duties of Appellate Courts
In cases tried without a jury, an appellate court reviews it both on
the law and on the evidence.55
Further, although due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses, the appellate
court cannot avoid the responsibility of such independent review and
consideration. Similarly, although the judgment shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, the upper court is enjoined by statute to give
such judgment as the trial court ought to have given, as to the appellate
court shall seem agreeable to law. Unless justice requires otherwise, the
court shall dispose finally of the case on appeal and no new trial shall be
ordered as to issues in which no error appears. 5
During the past year, these doctrines have been applied to equity
52. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Meyer, supra note 5.
53. Beckemeier v. Baessler, 270 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1954); Townsend v. Lawrence,
267 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. App. 1954); Wilson v. White, supra note 51.
54. Bonnot v. Tackitt, 265 S.W.2d 748 (Mo. App. 1954).
55. Alexander v. Glasgow, 275 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1955).
56. Emerson v. Treadway, supra note 17.
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cases in general 57 and, in particular, to proceedings to obtain injunc-
tions,58 and to actions for specific performance,59 to cancel deeds,60 to
rescind a real estate transaction,6 to obtain a ruling that a deed was given
only as security,62 to establish a trust,63 and to obtain an easement. 64
They have likewise been applied in general to actions at law tried
without a jury65 and, in particular, to actions for breaches of contract, 6
to enforce a lein,67 to recover a sum due from an estate,68 and to obtain
possession of realty.6 9
This is also true as to various phases of divorce proceedings, 70 and to
a case involving child custody.71
57. Meyer v. Schaub, 266 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1954); Miller v. Minstermann, 266
S.W.2d 672 (Mo. 1954); Larner-Diener Realty Co. v. Fredman, 266 S.W.2d 689 (Mo.
1954); Allen v. Kelso, 266 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. 1954); Creek v. Union Nat. Bank in
Kansas City, 266 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. 1954); Feste v. Bartlett, 269 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1954);
Allen v. Allen, 270 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. 1954); Nichols v. Wirts, 270 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1954);
Taylor v. Taylor, 270 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. 1954); George F. Robertson Plastering Company
v. Magidson, 271 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1954); Early v. Koelbel, 273 S.W.2d 312 (Mo. 1954);
Ensign v. Home for the Jewish Aged, 274 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. App. 1955); Reece v.
Van Gilder, 264 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. App. 1954); Dredge v. Busby, 269 S.W.2d 122 (Mo.
App. 1954); Junkins v. Local Union No. 6313, 271 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. App. 1954); Housden
v. Berns, 273 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. App. 1954); Robbins v. Anderson, 274 S.W.2d 809 (Mo.
App. 1955); E. C. Robinson Lumber Company v. Lowrey, 276 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. App.
1955); Coleman v. Coleman, 277 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App. 1955).
58. Jaeger v. Reynolds, 276 S.W.2d 182 (Mo. 1955); Miller v. Berry, 270 S.W.2d
666 (Mo. App. 1954); City of Spickardsville v. Terry, 274 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. App. 1954).
59. Glauert v. Huning, 266 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1954); Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277
S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1955).
60. Dillard v. Dillard, supra note 1; Meyer v. Schaub, supra note 57; Cleary v.
Cleary, 273 S.W.2d 340 (Mo. 1954); Balch v. Whitney, 273 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. 1954).
61. Blanke v. Miller, 268 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. 1954).
62. Ratermann v. Striegel, 273 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1954).
63. Ferguson v. Stokes, 269 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. 1954); Dallmeyer v. Dallmeyer, 274
S.W.2d 250 (Mo. 1955).
64. Jaeger v. Reynolds, supra note 58.
65. Scott v. Kempland, 264 S.W.2d 349 (Mo. 1954); Fort Osage Drainage District
v. Jackson County, 275 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. 1955); Emerson v. Treadway, supra note 56;
Wilson v. White, supra note 51; Brooks v. Dunson, 272 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. App. 1954);
Kraft v. Armentrout, 275 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. App. 1955).
66. Willibald Schaefer Co. v. Blanton Co., 264 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. App. 1954) and
Smith v. Githens, 271 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. App. 1954) in general; Joseph v. Mutual
Garage Co., 270 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. App. 1954), Bailment contract; Henley v. Fox,
272 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. App. 1954), sale of realty; Leader v. Pennell, 271 S.W.2d 57 (Mo.
App. 1954); note; State ex rel. Lyons v. Maryland Casualty Company, 278 S.W.2d 754
(Mo. 1955), official bond; Fulton v. City of Lockwood, 269 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1954);
Beckemeier v. Baessler, supra note 53, and Bonnot v. Tackitt, supra note 54, for the
value of services and materials.
67. E. C. Robinson Lumber Company v. Lowrey, supra note 57.
68. Peterson v. Peterson, 273 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1954).
69. Barker v. Allen, 273 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1954).
70. Cadenhead v. Cadenhead, 265 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. App. 1954); Easley v. Easley,
266 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. App. 1954); Wattson v. James B. Welsh Realty & Loan Co., 266
S.W.2d 35 (Mo. App. 1954); Prudot v. Stevens, 266 S.W.2d 756 (Mo. App. 1954); Kinder
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In an equity case, tried de novo, an appellate court is not required to
reverse a judgment because of the chancellor's incorrect rulings on evi-
dence, but it usually considers such evidence in the record as it deems
admissible, excludes from consideration evidence improperly admitted,
and reaches its judgment on the competent evidence offered without
regard to the trial court's rulings.72
A motion for a new trial on the grounds that the findings were
against the evidence and that the findings and judgment were for the
wrong party was too general to call the trial court's attention to the
question of the specific amount due under the note involved, but, in
view of the statutory provision that the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the judgment may be raised whether or not it was raised in the
trial court, such question could be reviewed on appeal. 73
CASES SUBmrD WrHOuT TRIAL
Where the submission of a case was in effect a submission on an
agreed statement of facts to be determined from the pleadings, interroga-
tories, and a copy of the pre-trial hearing, the court could properly con-
sider as true all of the new facts pleaded in the defendant's last filed
answer.
74
In deciding a case upon an agreed statement of facts to be determined
from the pleadings, legal conclusions stated in such pleadings are not to
be considered, but ultimate facts are.7 5
CONTROL OF COURT OVER JUDGMENT
A trial court has no power or authority to change or modify a judg-
ment after thirty days has elapsed since the entry of the judgment.7 0
Therefore, such a court has no power to enter a judgment reinstating
an action more than thirty days after the entry of a judgment dismissing
the action for want of prosecution. 77
v. Kinder, 267 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. App. 1954); Dagley v. Dagley, 270 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. App.
1954); Hicks v. Hicks, 270 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. App. 1954); Lockhart v. Lockhart, 271
S.W.2d 208 (Mo. App. 1954); Cherry v. Cherry, 272 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. App. 1954);
Forbis v. Forbis, 274 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. App. 1955).
71. Hensley v. Lake, 274 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. App. 1955).
72. Ensign v. Home for the Jewish Aged, supra note 57.
73. Dillard v. Thomas, supra note 15.
74. Alexander v. Glasgow, supra note 55.
75. Ibid.
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NEw TILs
a. Grounds for
During the past year, it has been decided that false answers 78 and
concealments on the voir dire,7 9 admission of improper evidence,80 in-
correct instructions,81 argument outside of the evidence,8 2 and an exces-
sive verdict8 3 were valid grounds for new trials.
A trial court is not justified in setting aside a verdict and in granting
a new trial on a ground of error committed during a trial, unless the error
was prejudicial to the losing party.84
Further, one waives a ground for a new trial, if he does not at the
trial present the issue involved in such a ground.8 5
b. Amendment of Motion
Neither leave of court, nor notice of the movant's intention to amend,
is required for the amendment of a motion for a new trial within the
time limited for the filing of such a motion.
8 6
c. Service of Motion
A copy of a motion for a new trial, together with all amendments
thereto, should be served upon the opposing parties before the presenta-
tion thereof to the court for disposition, since such a motion is not one
that may be disposed of ex parte.
8 7
d. Proof of Allegations of Motion
Allegations of a motion for a new trial do not prove themselves
notwithstanding the motion is sworn to by the plaintiff.
8 8
e. Time to Rule on Motion
It seems clear that it was the purpose of the legislature to provide
78. Girratono v. Kansas City Public Service Company, 272 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1954).
79. Johnson v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 265 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. 1954);
Girratono v. Kansas City Public Service Company, supra note 78.
80. Levin v. Hilliard, 266 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. 1954).
81. Burke v. Stix, Baer & Fuller Co., 264 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. 1954).
82. Stroh v. Johns, 264 S.W.2d. 304 (Mo. 1954).
83. Bartch v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 264 S.W.2d 937 (Mo. App. 1954).
84. Levin v. Hilliard, 266 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. 1954); Smith v. St. Louis Public
Service Company, 277 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1955).
85. Helton v. Huckeba, supra note 49.
86. State of Missouri ex rel. and to the Use of Hicklin v. Fidelity and Casualty
Company of New York, supra note 42.
87. Ibid.
88. McCormack v. McNamee, 274 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. 1955).
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and to allow the full period of 90 days after the filing of a motion for a
new trial, if required by the court, for its consideration of such a timely
motion taken under advisement, and that it was not intended to shorten
that period for the consideration by the court of matters timely submitted
by amendment and which expressly form a part of such a motion.80
Under the statute providing that a motion for a new trial is deemed
denied if not passed on within 90 days after the filing of such a motion,
where a motion was timely filed October 20 and was timely amended by
interlineation on an ex parte application October 22, the court had juris-
diction on January 19 following, 91 days after October 20, to grant the
motion.90
f. Construction of
Assignments of error in a motion for a new trial should be given
liberal construction. 9'
g. Discretion of Court
Although, in determining whether a motion for a new trial should be
granted, a trial court is vested with a wide discretion to be exercised in
furtherance of substantial justice, the idea that a judgment should not be
set aside arbitrarily, capriciously, or without good cause is inherent in
our practice. This thought finds expression in Supreme Court Rule 3.22
providing that the court may award a new trial of any issue upon good
cause shown and in Supreme Court Rule 3.25 permitting a trial court to
reopen, correct, amend or modify its judgment for good cause.92
h. What Court Must Consider
In a hearing on a motion for a new trial based on alleged false state-
ments of one juror in his voir dire examination before trial, which alleged-
ly resulted in prejudice to the defendant, a statement of the juror that he
had forgotten matters pertaining to which he had answered falsely did
not require the trial court to believe such statement, and, in determing
89. State of Missouri ex rel. and to the Use of Hicklin v. Fidelity and Casualty
Company of New York, supra note 42.
90. Ibid.
91. Stroh v. Johns, supra note 82.
92. Willis v. Willis, 274 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. 1955). In Triplett v. Beeler, 268
S.W.2d 814 (Mo. 1954), even a trial judge, who has the right to consider all of the
evidence and who has the opportunity to observe the situation, must have some
sound basis for disturbing a jury's finding.
[Vol. 20
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such issue, the court had to consider all of the facts and surrounding
circumstances.9 3
i. Specifying Reasons for Decision on
Whether entered on the motion of a party or on the court's initiative,
an order granting a new trial should specify the grounds therefor.9 4
The action of a trial court in adopting and specifying, as grounds for
a new trial, on assignments of error made by the movant, which particu-
larly specified alleged errors, sufficiently complied with the rule requiring
a statement of the reasons for granting such a motion; but an appellate
court could not approve a practice of adopting "shotgun" assignments
for such a purpose.9 5
A trial court, by specifying only one of several asserted grounds for a
new trial, in granting a motion for a new trial, in effect, overruled the
other grounds assigned.9 6
According to Supreme Court Rule 1.10, when a court grants a new
trial without specifying of record the ground or grounds therefor, the
presumption is that the court erroneously granted the motion for a new
trial, the burden of supporting such action is placed on the respondent,
and it shall never be presumed that the new trial was granted on any
discretionary grounds.9 7
j. Granting of on Court's Motion
Even though a trial court has inherent jurisdiction, during the period
for which it retains control over a judgment, to set aside the judgment on
its own motion, if, on a reconsideration and further reflection, it is satis-
fied that its first conclusions were wrong, and even though an outside
suggestion may be the motivating cause of the investigation resulting in
the setting aside of the judgment, it has long been recognized that a
judgment validly rendered following a trial upon the issues cannot be
vacated except upon "some legal ground."98
This right of a court to set aside a judgment on its own motion exists
93. Girratono v. Kansas City Public Service Company, supra note 78.
94. Willis v. Willis, supra note 92.
95. Caldwell v. St. Louis Public Service Company, 275 S.W.2d 288 (Mo. 1955).
96. Smith v. St. Louis Public Service Company, supra note 84.
97. Hall v. Brookshire, 267 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1954); Willis v. Willis, supra note 92.
98. Willis v. Willis, supra note 92.
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whether or not any erroneous ruling at the trial was excepted to by the
losing party.°9
k. Retrial Necessary after Granting of
The statute relating to the granting of a new trial empowers only
the granting of a new trial, which leaves the case open for a trial de novo.
It does not permit the rendition of a new judgment without a retrial.10 0
OBjECTIONS To TAIAL ERRORS
The usual law is that no allegations of error will be considered by
an appellate court except such as have been presented to or decided by
the trial court.'0 ' For exceptions to this rule, see Supreme Court
Rule 3.23.
Also, according to that rule, with the exceptions mentioned therein,
errors relied upon on appeal must be preserved by being assigned as
errors in a motion for a new trial. 0 2
Further, it has, been decided that it is necessary, in jury-tried cases,
in order to preserve the question of submissibility for appellate review,
to file a motion for a directed verdict at the close of all of the evidence
and to assign error of the trial court in failing to direct such a verdict in
an after-trial motion, either one for a new trial or one to set aside the
verdict and judgment and to enter judgment for the opposite party. 0 3
During the year our appellate courts have applied the general rule
to a defect of parties, 0 4 to an amendment of a pleading, 105 to alleged
99. Stroh v. Johns, supra note 82.
100. Willis v. Willis, supra note 92.
101. Scott v. Kempland, 264 S.W.2d 349 (Mo. 1954); Braudis v. Helfrich, 265 S.W.2d
371 (Mo. 1954); Nickels v. Witschner, 270 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. 1954); State of Missouri
ex rel. Cole v. Matthews, 274 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. 1955); Kauflin v. Turek, 277 S.W.2d
540 (Mo. 1955); Dillard v. Thomas, supra note 73; Stewart v. Stewart, supra note 32.
102.. Polster v. O'Hanlon, 267 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. App. 1954), in Re Village of
Pleasant Valley, 272 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. App. 1954);
The fact that the trial court failed to make findings of fact and to give a
statement of the grounds for its decisions, to which a party is entitled on request,
which procedural matter was not preserved for the reviewing court by stating it as
an allegation of error in a motion for a new trial, was waived. Alexander v. Glasgow,
supra note 55.
103. Ukman v. Hoover Motor Express Co., 269 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1954); Jameson v.
Fox, 269 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. App. 1954).
104. Ray v. Wooster, supra note 3; Sigman v. Rubeling, 271 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. App.
1954).
But notice that there is no waiver, where a defect of parties precludes the
stating of an action. Sigman v. Rubeling, supra this note.
105. Stewart v. Stewart, supra note 32.
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errors relating to the introduction of evidence, 0 6 to instructions,'" to
arguments, 08 to the inconsistency of a verdict, 0 9 to a nunc pro tune
order which ordered that a motion for a new trial should indicate that
it was timely filed, 10 to the refusal to grant a new trial,"' to interroga-
tories to a garnishee, n2 and to the awarding of and to the sufficiency of
alimony pendente lite."3
Generally, however, a party does not, by failure to object until after
verdict, waive prejudicial errors in the selection of jurors where the cir-
cumstances do not become known to him until after the verdict and where
there is no fault on his part with respect to his not obtaining such knowl-
edge previously.11 4
Moreover, the supreme court has held that it might decide constitu-
tional questions even ex mero motu where matters of public concern
are involved, and that it could do this even though the constitutional
questions have not been raised as orderly procedure required." 5
Also, a reviewing court passed upon an assignment of error to an
instruction relating to damages, though the appellant had not attacked the
verdict for excessiveness, as it thought that this matter involved a plain
error affecting substantial rights.1 6
106. Scneder v. Wabash R.R., 272 S.W.2d 198 (Mo. 1954); McCormack v. McNamee,
supra note 88; Ensign v. Home for the Jewish Aged, supra note 57; Horrell v. St. Louis
Public Service Co., 277 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. 1955); James v. Ray, 264 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. App.
1954); Bonnot v. Tackitt, supra note 54; Kimbrough v. Gross, supra note 36; State of
Missouri ex rel. State Highway Commission of Missouri v. Schade, 271 S.W.2d 196
(Mo. App. 1954); Fitzgibbon Discount Corporation v. Windisch, 271 S.W.2d 226
(Mo. App. 1954); Songer v. Brittain, 272 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. App. 1954); Housden v. Berns,
273 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. App. 1954); O'Connor v. Egan, 274 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. App. 1955).
107. Stroh v. Johns, supra note 82; Brock v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio R.R., 270
S.W.2d 827 (Mo. 1954); Haley v. Edwards, 276 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1955); Baird v.
Ellsworth Realty Co., supra note 51; James v. Fox, 269 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. App. 1954);
De Winter v. Lashley, 274 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. App. 1954).
108. Blanford v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 266 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. 1954); Harris v.
St. Louis Public Service Co., 270 S.W.2d 850 (Mo. 1954); Helton v. Huckeba, supra
note 49; Hancock v. Crouch, 267 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. App. 1954).
109. Connor v. Temm, 270 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. App. 1954).
110. Mirax Chemical Products Corp. v. Tarantola, 268 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. App. 1954).
111. Stroh v. Johns, supra note 82.
112. Brant v. Brant, 273 S.W.2d 734 (Mo. App. 1955).
113. Richardson v. Richardson, 270 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. App. 1954).
114. McCormack v. McNamee, supra note 88.
115. Harris v. Bates, 270 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. 1954).
116. Anderson v. Glascock, supra note 55.
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Judgments of lower courts are reviewed by appellate courts to correct
reversible errors committed by the trial court.""
c. Controversy Necessary
The existence of an actual and vital controversy susceptible of some
relief is essential to appellate jurisdiction." 9
d. Appellant Must be Aggrieved
Where a trial of a breach of contract action for $20,000 resulted in a
verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $4,000, and the defendants filed
no after-trial motion, thus showing a desire to abide by the conclusion, to
pay its judgment, costs, and litigation expenses and to extinguish the
liability which the supreme court had found existed in an amount
determinable by the jury, an erroneous order setting aside the judgment,
and granting a new trial, entitled the defendants to an appeal as aggrieved
parties, though the judgment set aside was against the defendants. 120
Where a defendant's motion for a new trial was sustained on the
issue of the amount of the plaintiff's damages, the defendant could com-
plain on appeal only of errors affecting the issue of his liability to the
plaintiff. He was aggrieved solely as to those errors.121
Where the plaintiff had a verdict and judgment, in the absence of an
apparent or demonstrated connection between the small size of the verdict
and the alleged irregularities in the selection of the jury, and in the ab-
sence of the contention that the alleged irregularities rendered the verdict
and judgment void ab initio, the plaintiff is in no position to urge such
irregularities in an appellate court.122
117. Lawrence County on Behalf of Tunnell v. Johnson, 269 S.W.2d 110 (Mo.
1954); Dugan v. Trout, 271 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. App. 1954).
118. Blanford v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 108.
119. Hribernik v. Reorganized School District R-3, supra note 1.
120. Adair County v. Urban, 268 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1954). For another case of an
aggrieved party, see Cunningham v. Leimkuehler, 276 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. App. 1955).
121. Nibler v. Coltrane, 275 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. 1955).
122. McCormack v. McNamee, supra note 88.
[Vol. 20
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One who has been validly granted a new trial is not an aggrieved
party.1 23
e. From What Appeal May be Taken
1. Final Judgments
There can be but one final judgment and it must dispose of all of
the issues and parties and the appeal must be taken from that judg-
ment.
24
A judgment sustaining a motion to quash an execution on the ground
that it was not supported by any final judgment was itself a final judg-
ment for the purpose of appeal.'2 5
2. Granting of a New Trial
Appeal may be taken from an order the effect of which is to grant
a new trial' x26
f. Substitution for an Appeal





Abandoned pleadings should be omitted from transcripts. 128
(b) Filing
The trial court retains jurisdiction of a case until the transcript on
appeal is filed in the appellate court.129
(c) Attitude of Appellate Court Toward
The appellate court must take the record as it finds it.30
Such a court accepts as true the recitation in a transcript as to what
happened during a trial.' 31
123. State of Missouri ex rel. and to the Use of Hicklin v. Fidelity & Casualty
Company of New York, supra note 42.
124. Sutton v. City of St. Joseph, 265 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. App. 1954).
125. Flynn v. Janseen, 266 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1954).
126. Adair County v. Urban, supra note 120.
127. Flynn v. Janseen, supra note 125.
128. Dugan v. Trout, supra note 24.
129. Nibler v. Coltrane, supra note 121.
130. E. C. Robinson Lumber Company v. Lowrey, supra note 57; Ellis v. State
Department of Public Health and Welfare, 277 S.W.2d 331 (Mo. App. 1955).
131. Flynn v. Janssen, supra note 125. To the effect that this rule applies to
selection of the panel, see McCormack v. McNamee, supra note 88; See Songer v.
Brittain, supra note 106, to the effect that it is neither the function nor the duty of an
appellate court to search the transcript for verification of factual statements.
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2. Briefs
(a) Abandonment of Grounds for Appeal
Allegations of error not developed in an appellant's brief by the
citation of authorities and an argument are treated as abandoned. 18 2
(b) Jurisdictional Statement
A statement in an appellant's brief that an action involved title to
realty and therefore the appeal was taken to the supreme court was a
conclusion and insufficient to show wherein the supreme court acquired
jurisdiction of appeal. It should have indicated how title to realty was
involved. 1 8
(c) Statement of Facts
A statement of facts is not fair, if it omits essential facts on which
the respondent relies.' 34
(d) Points and Authorities
To comply properly with Supreme Court Rule 1.08(a) (3), the allega-
tions of error and the points relied on should constitute a short concise
outline of the part of the brief called "an argument" in Supreme Court
Rule 1.08(a) (4). The purpose of this is to give the appellate court a
short concise summary of what the appellant claims the trial court did
wrong and why he claims it was wrong.135
132. Lansford v. Southwest Lime Co., 266 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1954); Conser v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 266 S.W.2d 587 (Mo. 1954); Grand River Tp., De Kalb
County v. Cooke Sales & Service, Inc., 267 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. 1954); State of Missouri
v. Harold, 271 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1954); Heuer v. Ulmer, 273 S.W2d 169 (Mo. 1954);
Palmer v. Lasswell, 267 S.W.2d 492 (Mo. App. 1954); Songer v. Brittain, supra note
106; Vosburg v. Smith, 272 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. App. 1954); Atkinson v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Company, 275 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App. 1955).
133. Schoenhals v. Pahler, 272 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. 1954).
134. Ibid.
135. Conser v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., supra note 132; Lewis v. Willingham, 274
S.W.2d 814 (Mo. App. 1955). In this case the plaintiffs brief fails to comply with
Supreme Court Rule 1.08 in that the attempted allegations of error wholly fail to show
what action or rulings of the trial court are sought to be reviewed and why they are
claimed to be erroneous.
Under points and authorities, the brief first states "Estoppel", and cites authori-
ties thereunder. 2. "Laches" and cites authorities thereunder. 3. "The priority of the
Production Credit Association's claim over the claim of Mrs. Lewis' attachment:"
It then asked the following questions:
A. Did the mentioning of the combines in the note, which was given to secure
the $10,000.00 indebtedness and which note was secured by a chattel mortgage on
numerous other property amount to anything more than a mortgage?
"B. Was it a pure conditional sales contract, or can it be construed for any
purpose other than a mortgage to secure the indebtedness?"
These allegations preserve nothing for review.
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Points on appeal consisting of abstract statements of law and quota-
tions from decisions present nothing for review.1 6
Assignments of error in a brief with reference to the admission and
exclusion of evidence present nothing for review when no specific evi-
dence or ruling is pointed out and the assignments contain no reference
to any specific portions of the record where the evidence or erroneous
rulings may be found.1 37
Further, assignments of error should state why a ruling of a court is
wrong.' 3 8
An assignment of error that "the evidence was insufficient under the
law to support the verdict" is a complaint that the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence. To say that there is an insufficient amount
of evidence implies that there is some evidence, and, therefore, to say that
the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict can be construed as
meaning that there is some evidence, but not enough, in the light of the
evidence to the contrary, to support the verdict.3 9
A separate state of "Assignments of Error" is no longer required and
only adds to the time, labor, expense, and space expended in appellant's
brief. The present rule requires only the "point relied on, which shall
specify the allegations of error, with citation of authorities.'
140
Authorities sustaining points must, when available, be cited.141
It is not sufficient to cite a key number in the Missouri Digest.142
(e) Argument
Where there are no references in the printed argument, or in the
points relied on, to the page or pages in the transcript where an action
136. Bonnot v. Tackitt, supra note 54; State of Missouri ex rel. State Highway
Commission of Missouri v. Schade, supra note 106; Lockhart v. Lockhart, 271 S.W.2d
208 (Mo. App. 1954); State ex rel. P. W. Finger Roofing Co. v. Koch, 272 S.W.2d 22
(Mo. App. 1954); Farmer v. The London & Lancashire Ins. Co., supra note 51.
137. Evinger v. Thompson, supra note 35; Ensign v. Home for the Jewish Aged,
supra note 57; Nibler v. Coltrane, supra note 121.
138. Evinger v. Thompson, supra note 35; Haley v. Edwards, 276 S.W.2d 153 (Mo.
1955); Townsend v. Lawrence, 267 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. App. 1954); State of Missouri ex
rel. State Highway Commission of Missouri v. Schade, supra note 106; De Voto v.
Fez Construction Company, 271 S.W.2d 199 (Mo. App. 1954); State ex rel. P. W.
Finger Roofing Co. v. Koch, supra note 136; Vosburg v. Smith, supra note 132.
139. Palmer v. Lasswell, supra note 132.
140. Seneder v. Wabash R.R., supra note 106.
141. Cherry v. Cherry, 272 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. App. 1954).
142. Atkinson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 132.
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of a court which is complained of may be found, there is a violation of
Supreme Court Rule 1.08. An appellate court is under no duty to search
a record in order to discover, if possible, errors committed by the trial
court.
1 4 3
h. Burden of Proof
On appeal the presumption is that the trial court decision was
correct and the burden is on the appellant affirmatively to show error as
a condition precedent to reversal.144
i. Changing Theories on Appeal
It is usually held that litigants on appeal must adhere to the theory
adopted in the trial court.14
5
The right to revoke this rule, however, is not without limitation.
While it may be invoked by a respondent, it is not always available to an
appellant. The reversal of a judgment must be based on the theory upon
which the cause was submitted and decided under the pleadings and
evidence of the losing party. On the other hand, an appellant should not
be permitted to object to the affirmance of a judgment on any theory if as
a matter of law the new theory sustains the judgment appealed from.140
j. Matters Considered on Appeal
A supplemental transcript on appeal, which failed to show compliance
with the statutory provisions for the preparation and filing of such a
transcript could not be considered by the supreme court on appeal.
147
Complaints of error found only in the plaintiff's printed argument and
not made in his points and authorities are abandoned and will not be
considered.148
Specific charges of negligence in a petition not submitted on appeal
are abandoned and will not be considered on appeal. 149
143. Ambrose v. M.F.A. Co-operative Ass!n., 266 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. 1954); Schoen-
hals v. Pahler, supra note 133; Bonnot v. Tackitt, supra note 54; State of Missouri ex
rel. State Highway Commission of Missouri v. Schade, supra note 106.
144. E. C. Robinson Lumber Company v. Lowrey, supra note 57. This rule was
applied to the giving of an instruction in Nibler v. Coltrane, supra note 121.
145. Small v. Wegner, 267 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1954); Welch v. McNeely, 269 S.W.2d
871 (Mo. 1954); Cleary v. Cleary, supra note 60; Dredge v. Busby, supra note 57;
Dillard v. Thomas, supra note 15; Dugan v. Trout, supra note 24.
146. Kirchner v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 267 S.W.2d 390 (Mo. App. 1954).
147. Fulton v. City of Lockwood, supra note 66.
148. Knight v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 268 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. App. 1954).
149. Cade v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 265 S.W.2d 366 (Mo. 1954).
[Vol. 20
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Likewise, where the plaintiffs did not appeal from the judgment
giving them a life estate in the land on which the house they built was
situated, they could not raise any questions about their interest in the
title to this land on appeal.'5"
The defendant's original counterclaim which was not offered in
evidence upon the trial was not before the court on appeal.1 51
A moot question need not be considered on appeal.
15 2
The general rule is that an appellate court will not consider matter
de hors the record. However, one exception to that rule is that such a
court will consider evidence outside of the record to determine whether
the question in controversy has become moot.
15 3
Where it appeared on the face of the record that the trial court found
that the instrument sued on was a valid and binding promissory note and
that the trial court rendered a judgment in conflict with the express terms
of the note, there was a plain error of record which caused manifest
injustice and the appellate court could consider such error regardless of
whether or not it was raised in the motion for new trial.
154
k. Duty of Appellate Court
1. In General
Upon appeal the reviewing court has the duty to enter the judgment
which the trial court should have entered.1 55
I Further, it is the duty of an appellate court to protect absent parties
in injunction proceedings. 1 56
2. In Connection with Pleadings
On appeal from a judgment dismissing a petition for failure to state
150. Reece v. Van Gilder, supra note 57.
151. Fulton v. City of Lockwood, supra note 66.
152. Daniels v. Brown, 266 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. 1954).
153. Koch v. Board of Regents of Northwest Missouri State College, 265 S.W.2d
421 (Mo. App. 1954).
154. Dillard v. Thomas, supra note 15. For a case in which there was no plain
error, see Bonnot v. Tackitt, supra note 54.
155. White v. Barton, 269 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. App. 1954); Richardson v. Richardson,
271 S.W.2d 338 (Mo. App. 1954); State of Missouri ex rel. Ratliff v. Morant, 271 S.W.2d
230 (Mo. App. 1954).
156. Hribernik v. Reorganized School District R-3, supra note 1.
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a cause of action, all well-pleaded facts and issues are to be taken as
true.157
Also, in determining whether or not a petition states a claim or cause
of action, the averments of the petition are to be given a liberal construc-
tion, according the averments their reasonable and fair intendment. So
considered, a petition should be held sufficient if its averments invoke
substantive principles of law which entitle plaintiff to relief. A petition
is not to be held insufficient merely because of a lack of definiteness or
certainty in allegation or because of informality in the statement of an
essential fact.158
In determining the cause of action intended to be pleaded under the
new code, an appellate court may consider the facts pleaded and the
relief sought.159
3. In Connection with Trial Arguments
Appellate courts will not determine whether a trial court has erred
in failing to sustain objections to an argument where the entire argument
is not available on appeal160
4. As to Admissions
On appeal, facts admitted by the briefs and oral arguments of the
appellant's counsel are accepted as true.101
5. As to Matters Involving Discretion
A reviewing court is likely to affirm an action by the trial court taken
in the exercise of discretion' 862
There follow statements of decisions in various situations in which
this general doctrine has been applied to rulings made at different stages
of a proceeding. They are listed in the order in which they would occur
during a legal proceeding.
In a hearing on a motion for alimony pendente lite and suit money
in a wife's divorce action, where the wife refused to answer interroga-
157. Lines v. Teachenor, 273 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. 1954).
158. Slicer v. W. J. Menefee Const. Co., 270 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1954).
159. Housden v. Berns, 273 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. App. 1954).
160. De Winter v. Lashley, 274 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. App. 1954).
161. Baker v. Baker, 274 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. App. 1955).
162. Trice v. Lancaster, supra note 27.
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tories submitted by her husband regarding her first marriage on the
ground that answers might incriminate her, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to strike the wife's pleading for her refusal to
answer interrogatories.0 3
A trial court refused to grant a request for a continuance in order to
have time to obtain a copy of the evidence of a witness at a former trial.
Where the record showed that counsel requesting the continuance had
agreed upon a setting of the case for trial on the date on which it was
tried, and without a copy of the witness' prior testimony, the matters
stated in the motion and shown by the exhibits were directed to the
trial court's discretion. No abuse of discretion was shown.164
Whether a statement is admissible under the res gestae rule depends
upon the particular circumstances; whether the statement is admissible
under those circumstances is within the trial court's discretion; and the
appellate court will not reverse the trial court's ruling unless it appears
that that discretion was abused.165
The sufficiency of evidence to lay a foundation for the introduction
of secondary evidence lies in the discretion of the trial court, and his
determination, although it is reviewable, will not be disturbed by a
reviewing court unless there has been an abuse of discretion.166
A reviewing court should not ordinarily interfere with the trial
court's discretion in determining whether proper facts have been estab-
lished to justify the admission of a record under the Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Law.167
A ruling of a trial court with respect to the scope and extent of cross-
examination in an ordinary civil suit will not be disturbed on appeal,
unless an abuse of discretion is shown.16
In an action by a passenger against a bus company for injuries
allegedly sustained when the bus stopped suddenly, the bus company had
a right to cross-examine the passenger with respect to discrepancies be-
163. Franklin v. Franklin, 273 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. App. 1955).
164. Helton v. Huckeba, supra note 49.
165. Cummings v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 269 S.W.2d Ill (Mo. 1954).
166. Nibler v. Coltrane, supra note 121.
167. Fisher v. Gunn, 270 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1954).
168. Fisher v. Gunn, supra note 167; Hoffman v. Illinois Terminal Railroad, 274
S.W.2d 591 (Mo. App. 1955).
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tween the complaint, which charged that the passenger fell on the pave-
ment, and the passenger's testimony, which did not disclose that he fell
to the pavement, and denying an inquiry on this subject was an abuse of
discretion and prejudicial error.16 9
A trial court's ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment will
not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.170
The giving or the refusal of withdrawal instructions is within the
sound discretion of the trial judge and, unless that discretion is abused,
his action will not be disturbed.171
The trial judge has a wide discretion in ruling as to the impropriety
and prejudicial effect of arguments of counsel, and his rulings will gener-
ally be deferred to by the appellate court.17 2
Hence, a reviewing court should defer to the judgment of a trial
court that improper argument to a jury was not so prejudicial as to justify
declaring a mistrial or granting a new trial.17
A trial court's decision as to the granting, or refusal to grant, a new
trial on the ground that false answers were made, or that facts were
not properly disclosed on the voir dire, was not disturbed on appeal.174
The rule is that, where the trial court has denied a new trial on such
a discretionary ground as the weight of the evidence, an appellate court
will not interfere with the court's ruling, unless it clearly appears that
the trial court has abused or arbitrarily exercised its discretion. 175
It is the rule in this state that the granting of a new trial on the basis
of newly discovered evidence rests very largely in the discretion of the
trial court, and, in the absence of a clear abuse of such discretion, the
appellate court will not interfere. Where the affidavits filed in support of
the motion disclose that the new evidence was merely cumulative and
probably would not have produced a different result if a new trial had
169. Hoffman v. Illinois Terminal Riailroad Company, supra note 168.
170. Butcher v. White, 267 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. App. 1954).
171. Songer v. Brittain, supra note 106.
172. Votrain v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 268 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. 1954).
173. Daniels v. Brown, 266 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. 1954); Hancock v. Crouch, 267 S.W.2d
36 (Mo. App. 1954).
174. Woodworth v. Kansas City Public Service Company, 274 S.W.2d 264 (Mo.
1955).
175. Conser. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., supra note 132; McCormack v. McNamee,
supra note 88; Palmer v. Lasswell, supra note 132.
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been granted, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
plaintiff's request.176
6. Weighing Evidence
The weight of the evidence in a jury case is for consideration only
by the trial court, and the assignments of error alleging that the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence and the law under the evidence
present nothing for appellate review.177
7. Agreed Statement
Where a case is submitted to a reviewing court on an agreed state-
ment of facts, the question involved is one of law to be decided by that
court.1 7 8
1. Test Applied on Appeal from Dismissal
of Petition for Failure to State
a Claim
On appeal from a judgment dismissing a petition for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, a reviewing court will construe
the petition favorably to the plaintiff, giving him the benefit of every
reasonable and fair intendment in view of the facts.1 79
m. Consideration of Evidence, in General
An appellate court is unable to consider assignments of error pre-
sented by a party requiring a consideration of the evidence where only a
part of the evidence is presented in the transcript. 80
176. Smith v. Smith, 267 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. App. 1954).
177. Nelson v. Tayon, 265 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1954); Lansford v. Southwest Lime
Co., 266 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1954); White v. Rohrer, 267 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1954); Amos
v. Southern Railway Company, 273 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. 1954); Sutton v. City of St.
Joseph, 265 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. App. 1954); Colley v. Cox, 266 S.W.2d 778 (Mo. App.
1954); Leader v. Pennell, supra note 66; De Voto v. Fez Construction Company, supra
note 138; Connor v. Temm, 270 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. App. 1954); Vosburg v. Smith, supra
note 132; Clark v. Howard, 273 S.W.2d 771 (Mo. App. 1954). Also see Brooks v.
St. Louis Public Service Company, 275 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. 1955), in which it was held
that upon appeal from an order granting a new trial in an automobile collision case,
the record would be viewed favorably to the verdict.
178. A.P. Green Fire Brick Company v. Missouri State Tax Commision, 277 S.W.2d
544 (Mo. 1955).
179. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 272 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. 1954).
180. Brooks v. Dunson, 272 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. App. 1954).
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n. Tests Applied in Reaching Judgment as
to Whether Submissible Case Has Been
Made
1. Substantial Evidence
Where there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury
is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its
conclusion. The appellate court's function is exhausted when that evi-
dentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might
draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reason-
able.' 8 1
Further, a reviewing court, in reviewing a contention of error in
overruling a defendant's motion for a directed verdict involving the
question whether the plaintiff made out a case for consideration by a jury,
must have a regard for the rule that substantial evidence must have been
introduced tending to prove facts essential to a plaintiff's recovery.8 2
Also, a reviewing court will not disturb a judgment for damages
amply supported by substantial, competent evidence. l s8
This general doctrine has been applied to reviews of administrative
decisions.' 84 However, it has been held that such decisions may be set
aside, if they are clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the
evidence. 185
Where there is a complete absence of probative facts to support a
verdict or a refusal to direct a verdict, an appellate court is justified in
reversing a judgment based upon such verdict or refusal to direct a
verdict 88
181. Sederquist v. Chicago, RI. & P. R.R., 268 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. 1954); State of
Missouri ex Tel. Chariton River Drainage District v. Montgomery, 275 S.W.2d 283
(Mo. 1955); R. J. Hurley Lumber Co. v. Cummings, 264 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. App. 1954);
Vosburg v. Smith, supra note 132; O'Connor v. Egan, 274 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. App. 1955);
Atkinson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 132.
182. Brawley v. Esterly, 267 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. App. 1954).
183. Kamo Electric Co-operative v. Baker, 274 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. App. 1954); State
ex rel. Burcham v. Drainage District No. 25, 272 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. App. 1954).
184. Union-May-Stern Company v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 273 S.W.2d
766 (Mo. App. 1954); Willens v. Personnel Board of Kansas City, 277 S.W.2d 665
(Mo. App. 1955).
185. Lunn v. Columbian Steel Tank Co., 275 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1955); Foster
v. Carter Carburetor Corp., 264 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. App. 1954); Hammett v. Nooter Corp.,
264 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. App. 1954).
186. Cummings v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 269 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. 1954); Helton v.
Huckeba, supra note 49; Walton v. Van Camp, 271 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. App. 1954);
O'Connor v. Egan, 274 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. App. 1955); Atkinson v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Company, supra note 132.
[-Vol. 20
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2. Evidence Considered
The supreme court, in passing on an assignment of error of the
defendant that there was no evidence to support a directed verdict for
the defendant, was required to give the plaintiff the benefit of any part
of the defendant's evidence which was favorable to the plaintiff and not
contradicted by the plaintiff's own testimony and not contrary to the
plaintiff's fundamental theory, and to give the plaintiff the benefit of all
reasonable inferences from all of the evidence, and to disregard all of
the defendants' evidence which was unfavorable to the plaintiff. 8 7
Also, in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
verdict, an appellate court takes as true the evidence offered by plain-
tiff. 8 8
Further, in reviewing an order overruling the defendant's motion for
a directed verdict, the supreme court considers the admitted facts.' 8 9
3. View Taken of Evidence
The supreme court, in determining on an appeal by a defendant
whether the plaintiff made a jury case, considers the evidence, from
the view most favorable to the plaintiff's contentions. 190
187. Ukman v. Hoover Motor Express Co., 269 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1954). Cases
decided during the past year which have supported this decision in whole or in
part are Wapelhorst v. Linder, 269 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. 1954); Moore v. Middlewest
Freightways, 266 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. 1954); Lebow v. Missouri Public Service Company,
270 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. 1954); Crandall v. McGilvray, 270 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. 1954);
Reimers v. Frank B. Connet Lumber Co., 271 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. 1954); East v. Mc-
Menamy, 266 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1954); Colley v. Cox, 266 S.W.2d 778 (Mo. App. 1954);
Berry v. McDaniel, 269 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. App. 1954); Walters v. Larson, 270 S.W.2d
112 (Mo. App. 1954); Smith v. Motors Ins. Corp., 270 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. App. 1954);
Songer v. Brittain, supra note 106; Vosburg v. Smith, supra note 132; De Long v.
Broadston, 272 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. App. 1954); O'Connor v. Egan, supra note 181;
Atkinson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company, supra note 132; Morris v. Alexander, 275
S.W.2d 373 (Mo. App. 1955); Executive Board of Mo. Baptist Gen. Ass'n v. Campbell,
275 S.W.2d 388 (Mo. App. 1955); Helton v. Huckeba, supra note 49). See Catanzaro v.
McKay, 277 S.W.2d 566 (Mo. 1955), which applies the same rules to a defendant's
appeal from an order setting aside a verdict in his favor and granting a new trial.
188. O'Connor v. Egan, supra note 187; Atkinson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company,
supra note 132.
189. Moore v. Middlewest Freightways, 266 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. 1954).
190. Hayes v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 269 S.W.2d 639 (Mo. 1954);
Wapelhorst v. Linder, 269 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. 1954); Lebow v. Missouri Public Service
Company, 270 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. 1954); Crandall v. McGilvray, 270 S.W.2d 793 (Mo.
1954); Catanzaro v. McKay, 277 S.W.2d 566 (Mo. 1955); Cunningham v. Thompson,
277 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1955); Bartch v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 264 S.W.2d
937 (Mo. App. 1954); Sutton v. City of St. Joseph, 265 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. App. 1954);
Colley v. Cox, 266 S.W.2d 778 (Mo. App. 1954); Palmer v. Lasswell, supra note 132;
Brawley v. Esterly, 267 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. App. 1954); Hammontree v. Edison Bros.
Stores, 270 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. App. 1954); Duvall v. Stokes, 270 S.W.2d 419 (Mo. App.
85
Eickhoff: Eickhoff: Work of the Supreme Court 1954
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1955
414 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20
This law has been applied where defendants have been successful
in the trial court and the plaintiff has appealed.10 1
o. Tests Applied in Determining the
Correctness of Instructions
In determining the correctness of instructions, the supreme court
has said that it should not be hypertechnical in requiring the use of
particular words or phrases, or in requiring any particular arrangement
or form of language, but that it should determine whether the average
laymen had been sufficiently apprised of the necessary facts to be
found by them, and of the correct legal conclusions which follow.192
p. Appeals on Ground of Excessive or Inadequate
Verdicts or Judgments
1. Right to Require Remittitur as
Condition to Affirmance
It has long been the settled law in this state that courts have the
power to keep verdicts within the limit of fair and reasonable compensa-
tion and mere excessiveness of the verdict may be cured in the appellate
court by remittitur193 The purpose of the practice is to avoid the
expense and delay of a new trial; and the court grants the plaintiff an
election to remit without regard to the consent of the defendant, who
can not be harmed by whichever choice the plaintiff makes. The
practice is only pursued when there is nothing in the record to indicate
that the excessive verdict was due to anything other than mere mistake
or misunderstanding on the part of the jury, and not when it was
attributable to passion and prejudice of the jury, which necessarily
1954); Helton v. Huckeba, supra note 49; Songer v. Brittain, supra note 106; Vosburg
v. Smith, supra note 132; Morris v. Alexander, 275 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. App. 1955);
Bartling v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, 275 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. App. 1955);
Pettit v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, 277 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. App. 1955).
It was held in Burns v. Lewis-Howe Co., 266 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. App. 1954) that
it is an appellate court's duty in reviewing the evidence upon a motion for a directed
verdict to view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff's case. This does
not mean, however, that it should give the evidence a strained construction or draw
unreasonable inferences in favor of a plaintiff. Nor should it consider isolated por-
tions of a witnesses' testimony with reference to a particular fact, but should consider
all the testimony of said witness with reference to the subject matter, in order to
determine the effect of same.
191. White v. Rohrer, 267 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1954); Welch v. McNeely, 269 S.W.2d
871 (Mo. 1954).
192. Stoessel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 269 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1954).
193. Seneder v. Wabash R.R., supra note 106.
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vitiates the verdict in its entirety. However, in affirming a judgment
upon the condition of remittitur, it is to be remembered that the appellate
court is not substituting its own judgment for that of the jury in
fixing the amount of the damages, but is only determining the maximum
amount which the evidence would support, and at the same time
saying that, if the jury had stopped at such amount, the verdict in
that event would have been allowed to stand. 94
The verdict of a jury which the trial court permits to stand, as
corrected by remittitur, presupposes a verdict resultant of the jury's
unbiased, dispassionate, and impartial consideration of the evidence,
and the mere size of a ,verdict for damages, although it is necessary
to reduce it one-half or more by remittitur, does not of itself indicate
passion or prejudice on the part of the jury which vitiates the verdict. 95
It has been held recently that a jury's action should not be
interfered with by a reviewing court unless the injustice of the size of
the verdict is manifest, and is so grossly excessive as to indicate an
arbitrary exercise and abuse of discretion.196
It is now settled that a verdict will be set aside as inadequate for
the same reasons that justify setting it aside as excessive. If it is so
grossly inadequate as to indicate prejudice of the jury, it is the duty of
the trial court to set it aside.'9 7
2. Matters Considered in Determining Whether
Verdict is Excessive or Inadequate
There is no exact formula for gauging whether a verdict is excessive.
Each case must be considered upon its particular facts. Consideration is
given to the nature and extent of the injuries and disabilities, diminished
earning capacity, changing economic factors, and the compensation award-
ed and approved in cases of similar or fairly comparable injuries. The
nature, extent, and permanency of the injuries are the paramount factors
and the ultimate test of the excessiveness or of the inadequacy of an
194. Sanders v. Illinois Central R.R., 270 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. 1954). For other cases
holding that a verdict which is the result passion and prejudice cannot be cured by
remittitur, see Tate ex rel. Burcham v. Drainage District No. 25, 272 S.W.2d 712
(Mo. App. 1954) and Day v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 276 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. 1955).
195. Rucker v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 268 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. 1954).
196. Sutton v. City of St. Joseph, 265 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. App. 1954). See also
Triplett v. Beeler, 268 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. 1954).
197. Hufft v. Kuhn, 277 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1955).
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award is what will fairly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff for
his injuries.198
3. Weighing Evidence-Substantial Evidence
In reviewing an assignment of error that damages awarded, as
reduced by remittitur required by the trial court as a condition to over-
ruling a motion for a new trial, were grossly excessive, the reviewing
court does not weigh the evidence but examines the record to determine
whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's ruling,
and, if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling,
affords reasonable and substantial support thereof, the ruling must be
sustained.199
It has also been held recently that, in determining whether a verdict
is excessive, the reviewing court should consider the failure of the trial
court to set aside the verdict as excessive or to order a remittitur,20 0 and
that an appellate court should not interfere with the amount of a judgment
for damages for personal injuries which has been allowed to stand by the
trial court unless the amount is so grossly excessive or unmistakably
beyond the bounds of reason as to be shocking to the judicial con-
science. 201
q. Trial Court's Decision Presumed Correct
On appeal, the presumption always is that the decision of the lower
court was correet.
202
Thus, when it does not appear upon the record that any of the juris-
dictional prerequisites are absent, it is presumed that the court found all
of the facts necessary to its jurisdiction.20 3
198. Rodefeld v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 275 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1955). See also
Triplett v. Beeler, 268 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. 1954).
199. Daniels v. Brown, 266 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. 1954). Also, see Kraus v. Kansas
City Public Service Co., 269 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. 1954); Day v. Union Pacific R.R., 276
S.W.2d 212 (Mo. 1955); Missouri Public Service Co. v. Hunt, 274 S.W.2d 27 (Mo.
App. 1954).
For other cases holding that appellate courts, in deciding whether verdicts
are excessive, should consider the evidence from the view most favorable to the
plaintiff, see Arditi v. Brooks Erection Co., 266 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1954); Scneder v.
Wabash R.R., supra note 106; McCormack v. McNamee, supra note 88; Rodefeld v.
St. Louis Public Service Company, supra note 198; Day v. Union Pacific R.R., 276
S.W.2d 212 (Mo. 1955); Hufft v. Kuhn, 277 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1955).
200. Sutton v. City of St. Joseph, 265 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. App. 1954).
201. State ex rel. Burcham v. Drainage District No. 25, 272 S.W.2d 712 (Mo.
App. 1954).
202. Emerson v. Treadway, supra note 17.
203. State ex rel. and to the Use of Hicklin v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York, supra note 42. Also, see Prudot v. Stevens, supra note 70.
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Where no declarations of law were asked or given in the trial court,
the reviewing court would assume that the trial court tried the case upon
a correct theory of law.20
4
On appeal, the presumption is that the trial court, in weighing the
evidence, was governed by correct rules of law.20
5
Where it could not be ascertained by the appellate court from its
record whether a copy of the amended motion for a new trial had been
served upon the opposing party, but the court had taken up the amended
motion without objection, it would be presumed that the court acted
according to law in so considering the motion.20 6
r. Judgment of Appellate Court
1. Dismissal Because Cause Is Moot
A cause which has become moot may be dismissed by an appellate
court. The motion to obtain a dismissal on this ground may be supported
and controverted by affidavits which may be considered by the appellate
court when it is determining the truth of the grounds pleaded in the
motion.2 07
2. Dismissal for Noncompliance with Rules of Court
An appellate court may dismiss an appeal for failure of an appellant
to comply with the supreme court's rules concerning the method of appeal.
Recently there have been dismissals for failure to follow Supreme Court
Rule 1.08 relating to the contents of briefs.20 8
However, where a respondent has substantially corrected the omis-
sions in the appellant's statement of facts in his brief, a motion to dismiss
for failure to make a proper statement of the facts will be dismissed.20 9
A motion to dismiss on appeal because of the late delivery to the
respondent of copies of the appellant's brief was overruled where no
complaint of the tardy delivery of the brief was made until the filing of
204. Emerson v. Treadway, supra note 17.
205. Emerson v. Treadway, supra note 17.
206. State ex rel. and to the Use of Hicldin v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of
New York, supra note 42. Also, see Caldwell v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 275
S.W.2d 288 (Mo. 1955).
207. Koch v. Board of Regents of Northwest Missouri State College, 265 S.W.2d 421
(Mo. App. 1954).
208. Ambrose v. MF.A. Co-operative Ass'n., 266 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. 1954); Songer v.
Brittain, 272 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. App. 1954); Geary v. Geary, 277 S.W.2d 327 (Mo. 1955).
209. Wilt v. Waterfield, 273 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. 1954).
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the motion to dismiss more than two weeks after the case had been
submitted to the appellate court for decision and where no brief was
presented on behalf of the respondent.210
3. Dismissal Because the Appellant Filed Abbreviated
Transcript without Respondent's Consent
An appeal may be dismissed if an appellant files an abbreviated
transcript without the respondent's consent. In a recently decided case,
an appellant's counsel more than thirty days prior to the time for
filing the transcript in the circuit court, served on the defendant's
counsel a statement of the points to be relied on in the appellate court,
together with a statement of the facts which the evidence tended to
prove, and the defendants failed, within ten days thereafter, to indicate
whether they desired the evidence to be included in the transcript. The
appellant considered that, by such failure, the defendants agreed that
said statement was correct and that the evidence need not be included
in the transcript. He relied on Supreme Court Rule 1.06 to support this
contention. The court held that that rule, which permits an omission
of the evidence from the transcript, was not applicable for several
reasons. First, the rule applies solely "when an appellant desires only
to have reviewed legal questions with respect to instructions given or
refused.. .". There were no instructions given or refused in this case.
The rule also provides that the appellant, after serving such statement,
shall file the same in the trial court. (The italics are those of the appellate
court.)
The court said that there was nothing in this record to indicate that
the statement was filed and the appellant did not claim that it was done.
The rule also requires that "the statement shall . . . contain a request
to the respondent to indicate ... whether or not the respondent desires
the evidence to be included in the transcript". There was attached to the
appellant's suggestions in opposition to the motion to dismiss, a copy
of the statement of points to be relied on, and a copy of the "stipulation
of facts". Neither requested the defendants to state whether they
desired "the evidence to be included in the transcript" and the
appellant made no contention that a separate written request was made.
For these reasons, Supreme Court Rule 1.06 was held to be of no aid
to the appellant.21'
210. Willis v. Willis, 274 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. 1955).
211. Brooks v. Dunson, 272 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. App. 1954).
[Vol. 20
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4. Judgment Affirmed or Reversed
Decrees are to be affirmed on appeal if the right result is reached
in the trial court, though the reason advanced for the affirmance is not
the correct ground for sustaining the decree.2 12
In order that a judgment may be reversed because of an error of a
trial court, the error must materially affect the merits of the action.2 13
Applying this doctrine, the Missouri appellate courts, during the
last twelve months, have affirmed judgments which have been appealed
from on the grounds that courts have erred in sustaining a petition
where it was claimed that there was inconsistency in a single count,214
in admitting evidence,2 15 in excluding evidence,216 in giving instruc-
tions,217 in refusing instructions,218 in connection with arguments,2 19 in
denying a request to set aside a judgment,220 in the form of an order
directing a remittitur,221 and in the granting of a new trial.222
It has also been decided that alleged trial errors are deemed
immaterial where the reviewing court has determined that there is no
case for the jury.2 23
212. Decker v. Fitge, 276 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1955).
213. Clayton v. St Louis Public Service Company, 276 S.W2d 621 (Mo. App. 1955).
214. Grand River TP., De Kalb County v. Cooke Sales & Service, Inc., 267 S.W.2d
322 (Mo. 1954).
215. Evinger v. Thompson, 265 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. 1954); Conser v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry., 266 S.W.2d 587 (Mo. 1954); Daniels v. Brown, 266 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. 1954);
Cox v. Wrinkle, 267 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1954); Boring v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co.,
274 S.W.2d 233 (Mo. 1955); Horrell v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 277 S.W.2d 612 (Mo.
1955); Lockhart v. Lockhart, 271 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. App. 1954); Housden v. Berns, 273
S.W.2d 794 (Mo. App. 1954); Heiter v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 275 S.W.2d 612
(Mo. App. 1955); Thomas v. Boone Electric Cooperative, 277 S.W.2d 640 (Mo. App.
1955).
216. Ferguson v. Stokes, 269 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. 1954); Wapelhorst et ux. v. Lindner,
269 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. 1954); Housden v. Berns, 273 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. App. 1954); Clay-
ton v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 276 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. 1955).
217. Arditi v. Brooks Erection Co., 266 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1954); Largo v. Bonadonna,
269 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1954); Trice v. Lancaster, 270 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. App. 1954); Morris
v. Alexander, 275 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. App. 1955).
218. Rexite Casting Co. v. Midwest Mower Corp., 267 S.W.2d 327 (Mo. App. 1954);
Proceedings for Condemnation of Private Property for Sixth Street Expressway,
Kansas City v. National Engineering & Manufacturering Company, Inc., Lessee of
Tract 63, 274 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. App. 1955).
219. Wapelhorst v. Lindner, 269 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. 1954); State of Missouri ex -rel.
Ratliff v. Morant, 271 S.W.2d 230 (Mo. App. 1954); Hoffman v. Illinois Terminal RR.
Co., 274 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. App. 1955); Clayton v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 276
S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. 1955).
220. Ebenreck v. Union Service Co., 276 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. App. 1955).
221. Hunter v. Roberts, 267 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. App. 1954).
222. Stroh v. Johns, 264 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1954); Girratono v. Kansas City Public
Service Co., 272 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1954); Woodworth v. Kansas City Public Service Co,
274 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. 1955).
223. Branstetter v. Kunzler, 274 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. 1955).
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On the other hand, appellate courts have decided that errors of
trial courts in connection with the voir dire examination,224 instruc-
tions, 225 the argument,226 the submission of a case to the jury without
evidence to substantiate a finding for the plaintiff,22T and the granting
of a judgment for the defendant when the plaintiff had a right to
nominal damages, 228 were prejudicial and have, for that reason, reversed
judgments.
The burden rests on the appellate to establish reversible error. 229
The death of a defendant having been suggested and shown to
have occurred after the final submission of a case in an appellate court,
it was ordered that the judgment of the appellate court affirming the
judgment of the circuit court should be entered as of the date of
such submission.23 0
5. Cause Remanded
The furtherance of justice requires that a case should not be
reversed without remanding unless the appellate court is convinced
that the facts are such that a recovery cannot be had; and, even though
the plaintiff fails to substantiate the theory upon which his case was
tried, if he nevertheless shows a state of facts which might entitle him to
recover if his case were brought upon a proper theory, the judgment will
not be reversed outright, but instead, in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion, the case will be remanded to give him the opportunity to
amend his petition so as to state a case upon the theory which his
evidence discloses.231
It is also well established that a judgment will not be reversed
without a remand unless the record clearly shows that the available
224. Moore v. Middlewest Freightways, 266 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. 1954); Woodworth v.
Kansas City Public Service Co., 274 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. 1955).
225. Lerner v. Yeghishian, 271 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. App. 1954).
226. Bartch v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 264 S.W.2d 937 (Mo. App. 1954);
Clayton v. St. Louis Public Service Company, 276 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. 1955).
227. Hoffnan v. Illinois Terminal Railroad Co., 274 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. App. 1955).
228. State of Missouri ex. rel. Ratliff v. Morant, 271 S.W. 2d 230 (Mo. App. 1954).
229. McDill v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 268 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1954).
230. George F. Robertson Plastering Co. v. Magidson & Oakland Realty Co., 271
S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1954).
231 East v. McMenamy, 266 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1954); Stouse v. Stouse, 270 S.W.2d
822 (Mo. 1954); Emerson v. Treadway, 270 S.W-2d 614 (Mo. App. 3954); Wright v.
Fick, 275 S.W. 2d 607 (Mo. App. 1955). ,
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essential evidence has been fully presented and that the plaintiff cannot
recover in any event.232
Further, although a judgment, based on respondeat superior, against
a partnership in the firm name was void, where there was no service
upon, or entry of appearance by, any individual partner, and neither
the answer nor the entry of appearance by the firm purported to be
that of any individual partner, or authorized for him, and where the
status of an alleged agent, upon whose negligence the suit was founded,
had not been fully developed at the trial, the cause was remanded to
afford an opportunity to bring in additional parties if the plaintiff
desired to retry the case.23 3
When the only claim on appeal is that the decision in the trial
court was incorrect as to damages, there may be a remand for a
retrial only as to damages. 23 4
Further, it has been held that, where a suit for an injunction
could not be maintained by the plaintiff, judgment on the merits in
favor of the defendants should be reversed and the cause remanded
with directions to dismiss the petition. In support of this ruling the
court cited Section 512.160 of our Revised Statutes.23 5
s. Transfer from Court of Appeals
to Supreme Court
When a case is transferred from a court of appeals to the supreme
court, the latter court considers the case as if the proceeding had been
brought directly to it from the trial court.
23 6
t. Transfer from Division of Supreme Court
to Supreme Court Sitting en Banc
A cause transferred by a division of the supreme court to the court
232. State of Missouri ex -rel. Ratliff v. Morant, 271 S.W.2d 230 (Mo. App. 1954);
Cummins v. Dixon, 265 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. 1954); Niedergerke v. Niedergerke, 271 S.W.2d
204 (Mo. App. 1954); City of Fredericktown v. Hunter, 273 S.W.2d 732 (Mo. App. 1954).
233. Davison v. Farr, 273 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. 1954).
234. Williams v. Kansas City, 274 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. 1955); Huff v. Kuhn, 277 S.W.2d
552 (Mo. 1955); Cirese v. Spitcaufsky, 265 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. App. 1954); De Long v.
Broadston, 272 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. App. 1954); Davison v. Farr, 273 S.W.2d 500 (Mo.
App. 1954).
235. Lane v. Finney, Trustee, 274 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. App. 1955).
236. Collins v. Division of Welfare, 270 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1954); State ex rel.
Schneider's Credit Jewelers, Inc. v. Brackman, 272 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1954); Helton v.
Huckeba, 276 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. 1955).
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en banc where it is then docketed, stands before the court en bane anew,
for submission and disposition de novo, as though the case had never
been before a division of the supreme court at any time.238 7
While the briefs which may have been filed in a case while it is in
a division of the supreme court go to the court en bane with the case
when it is transferred there, the status of the case after transfer to the
court en bane is as though briefs had never been filed therein. However,
when a cause is transferred from a division of the court to the court
en bane any of the litigents therein is then entitled, as of course and
of right, to file an entirely new brief in the cause if he so desires, and in
such a brief any and all points may be raised which the record of the
case warrants23 8
237. Hall v. Brookshire, 267 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1954).
238. Hall v. Brookshire, 267 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1954).
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